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I. PRESENT RECOLLECTION REFRESHED
A written memorandum may be used by a witness to refresh present
memory of a past event. When such a memorandum is used, the op-
posing party has the right to examine the memorandum.' The most
frequently encountered example of such use is where a police officer
refers to his notebook to recall a past event. In Allen v. State,2 a police
officer, who was at the scene, was called as a witness by the state and
used his notebook to refresh his recollection. Defense counsel moved
for inspection of the memorandum at trial and at a plenary hearing.
The court's subsequent denial of the motion was held to be reversible
error since basic principles of fair play required that the defense have
access to the memorandum for possible impeachment purposes.
Although Allen seems to merely restate a general rule of evidence,'
the application of the rule is not as broad as it might be. In Darrigo v.
State,4 informal notes made by a police officer outlining admissions
made by an accused, which were never reduced to verbatim statements,
were held to be beyond the scope of discovery procedures.' These mem-
oranda were held to be "the work product of the officer," 6 and not
discoverable even under the provision of Florida Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 1.220(a)(1), which allows pre-trial inspection of "defendant's
written or recorded statements . . .whether signed or unsigned." Thus,
memoranda which may be used by the police to refresh memory are
not subject to examination by the defense unless such memoranda are
referred to or used in the criminal proceeding itself.
II. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
A. Direct Examination
The decision on whether to utilize pointed questions or a narrative
format for eliciting testimony is largely discretionary with the party
1. Henniger, Best Evidence Rule, in FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, Evi-
DENCE IN FLORIDA § 13.10 (1971).
2. 243 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Allen].
3. C. MCCORM CK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 9, at 17 (1954).
4. 243 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
5. FLA. R. Cum. P. 1.220.
6. Darrigo v. State, 243 So.2d 171, 173 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). But see Dade County v.
Monroe, 237 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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calling the witness." However, when a party appears in proper person
and also wishes to present testimony, the narrative form is the only
logical way to proceed. In Karwowski v. Peterman,8 a Michigan at-
torney who intervened as a plaintiff and elected to represent himself
proffered narrative testimony in support of his position. The reviewing
court held that the trial did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the
proffered narrative where it appeared that the trial had become chaotic,
and where in addition to the narrative, the plaintiff had proffered over
seven hundred documents without any predicate being provided. The
form of testimony was also at issue in Grech v. State.' There, the wit-
ness involved was ten years old and prefaced each of her statements
with "I think" or "I believe." The court refused to hold the testimony
speculative or uncertain, apparently on the basis that testimony other-
wise competent is not made incompetent by such a preface in this type
of situation.
In a suit brought by a real estate broker for his commission, ° the
plaintiffs called the defendant as their witness. They dismissed him and
later sought to call him as an adverse witness. The request to recall
the witness was denied by the trial court. On appeal, this refusal was
held to be error since the witness was not a nominal defendant and
was, therefore, clearly an adverse witness."
Finally, it seems that the concept of harmless error describes the
outer limits of direct examination. In Becton v. State,2 the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed a trial court order which al-
lowed the prosecutor to "third degree" his own witness who repeatedly
"did not recall" and could not remember. The error, if any, was found
to be harmless.
B. Examination by the Court
It seems well established that a Florida trial judge may not comment
on the weight or creditability of the evidence. In Esposito v. State, the
court, in an effort to rehabilitate a state witness, commented that a wit-
ness who had been given a sentence to run concurrently with one already
being served was not "let off with nothing," as the defense counsel had
suggested. This statement was held to be unfair comment on the evi-
dence. Yet during the period under survey, two reported decisions al-
luded to an examination of witnesses by the court. In Cude v. Deal,4 the
court questioned the plaintiff's only expert witness in a medical malprac-
tice suit in chambers and in the absence of counsel. The testimony was
7. C. ALLOWAY, FLORIDA EVIDENCE CASEBOOK pt. II, 10 (1971).
8. 238 So.2d 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
9. 243 So.2d 216 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 247 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1971).
10. Goldberg v. Russo, 233 So.2d 134 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
11. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(a).
12. 227 So.2d 223 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
13. 243 So.2d 451 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
14. 234 So.2d 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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taken down by a court reporter and was concerned with clarifying testi-
mony relative to the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The question-
ing was undertaken to aid the court in deciding a motion for a directed
verdict and was done with the assent of both attorneys. The reviewing
court found the procedure "irregular," but ruled that any objection had
been waived by the consent to the examination. An uncontested divorce
proceeding in which child custody was in issue produced an analogous
situation. 5 The plaintiff husband had filed a divorce action and had en-
tered into a stipulation with the defendant mother consenting to the de-
fendant's custody of their child. The defendant did not thereafter defend
the action, and a default was subsequently entered. During later ex parte
proceedings, the record of the decision disclosed the following, rather
remarkable colloquy:
COURT: Do you want the baby?
PLAINTIFF: Yes, sir, I'd love to have the baby.
COURT: Okay, we're going to give the baby to you.'6
After this exchange, plaintiff's counsel suggested that the defendant be
given notice of the proceeding. The court then refused to let plaintiff's
counsel "cross-examine his own witness" and proceeded with the hearing.
The case was reversed on other grounds.
C. Cross-Examination
1. AVAILABILITY OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
A required predicate for the cross-examination of a witness is a
direct examination of some sort. During the period surveyed the question
of what constitutes a direct examination arose. In Irvin v. State,'7 an
individual was brought into the courtroom for the witness on the stand
to identify. The individual merely stated his name and was not sworn in.
Opposing counsel requested an opportunity to examine this individual,
but apparently did not wish to call him as his witness. The request was
denied. The reviewing court held that the denial was proper because the
individual was never sworn in or called as a witness by either side.
2. SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
The scope of cross-examination presents more complex problems.
The general rule in Florida is that cross-examination extends to the entire
subject matter of direct examination "and to all matters that may modify,
supplement, contradict, rebut, or make clearer the facts testified to in
chief ....", Statements made on direct are said to "open the door" to
15. Williams v. Williams, 227 So.2d 746 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
16. Id. at 747.
17. 246 So.2d 592 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 251 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1971).
18. Cocoa v. State, 62 So.2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1953) [quoting with approval 58 Am. JuR.
Witnesses § 632 (1938)], cert. denied, 349 U.S. 931 (1954), reh. denied, 350 U.S. 855 (1955).
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inquiry on cross. In Williams v. State,x" the defendant testified on direct
that he had offered to take a lie detector test but had not been given such
a test. On cross-examination, the state attorney inquired as to the reason
the test had not been administered. That question was held to be within
the proper bounds of a cross-examination." Similarly, in a condemnation
action,2' the plaintiff's expert witness testified on direct examination that
he thought the highest and best use to which the condemnee's land could
be put was timber farming. The trial court precluded cross-examination
into matters of future use and the condemnee's apparent intent in hold-
ing the land. On appeal, this ruling was held to be an improper restriction
on cross-examination since direct testimony about the highest and best
use "opened the door" to the areas sought to be pursued. The door must,
however, be opened on direct. In Armstrong v. State,22 the defendant in
a murder prosecution testified that he had previously been shot in the
arm. The trial court's refusal to allow inquiry into the details of the prior
shooting was upheld on appeal.23
3. LIMITATIONS ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
In addition to limitations on the general scope of cross-examination,
certain specific limitations also have been applied. In a case which
achieved some local notoriety, cross-examination of a state informer was
found properly restricted "in order to prevent the trial from being con-
verted into a trial of the state's witness.' 24
Another limitation on cross-examination concerns questions relating
to uncharged crimes. 5 In Cunningham v. State,2 6 the defendant in a
murder prosecution denied having been convicted of aggravated assault
on four specific dates. The state proceeded to prove a conviction on one
of the four dates but produced nothing in regard to the other three dates.
This interrogation was held to be harmless error.
In Duncomb v. State,25 it appeared that three state witnesses had
been interviewed in the presence of each other by a prosecutor prior to
trial. At trial, cross-examination was limited to revealing the details of
19. 238 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 241 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1970).
20. The rules regarding admission of polygraph results and mention of polygraph
examination are summarized in Kuperstein, Evidence, 1965-1967 Survey of Florida Law,
22 U. MiAmi L. REv. 572, 572-73 (1968).
21. Stack v. State Road Dept., 237 So.2d 240 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
22. 243 So.2d 181 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
23. This case is interesting for another reason. Apparently, the testimony concerning
the shooting would have involved mention of a collateral crime. Therefore, it appears that
the Williams rule door does not swing both ways. See section VII infra.
24. Horwitz v. End, 245 So.2d 116 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971) (the witness involved was
Charles Celona).
25. The admissibility vel non of uncharged crimes will be discussed in Section VII
infra.
26. 239 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
27. See FLA. STAT. § 924.33 (1969).
28. 237 So.2d 86 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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the interview. The court rejected an attempt to direct further testimony
toward demonstrating that the action of the state attorney was unethical
-apparently on the ground of immateriality. On appeal, it was held
that the permitted cross-examination sufficiently advised the jury of the
circumstances to allow them to make a judgment as to the witnesses'
credibility.
In another criminal appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, gratuitously suggested that it would not be error to permit cross-
examination of a defendant as to "why he remained silent and did not
talk to police when he invoke[d] his constitutional right to remain si-
lent."2 9 If such a rule should materialize, its net effect would probably
be to discourage defendants who had asserted their rights under Miranda
v. Arizona"° from taking the stand in their own defense. Whether such a
rule would pass constitutional tests seems doubtful. Additionally, it is
clear that cross-examination may not apply to areas "far afield"'" of
direct. Questions regarding why a defendant remained silent seem far
afield of any conceivable questions on direct examination.
III. OPINION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Lay Opinion Admissible
The general rule regarding lay opinion testimony is that it is not
admissible in the absence of special circumstances militating towards its
admission. 2 During the period under survey, lay opinion testimony was
admitted in several interesting instances.
In Town of Palm Beach v. Carter," the town manager testified in
generalities about accidents with no apparent showing of first hand
knowledge. 4 The manager testified that:
The life of the bathers [was in danger] ... because surfboards
were getting away from the surfers and they come ramming
into the beaches and we had several people hurt ....
The court referred to this statement as "petitioner's conclusion."3 This
testimony is particularly notable in light of the number of cases in which
"safety experts" testified as to the existence of hazards. 7
Additionally, it was recognized that the owner of condemned prop-
29. Thomas v. State, 249 So.2d 510, 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
30. 348 U.S. 436 (1966).
31. Lentini v. State, 231 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
32. C. McCoRmiucx, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 11 (1954); Spence and Orseck, Witnesses, in
FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, EVIDENCE IN FLORIDA § 4.30 (1971).
33. 229 So.2d 3 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 237 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1970).
34. On the requirement of first hand knowledge, see C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 10 (1954).
35. Town of Palm Beach v. Calder, 229 So.2d 3, 4 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
36. Id. at 5.
37. E.g., Johnson v. Hatoumn, 239 So.2d 22 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. dismissed, 244
So.2d 740 (Fla. 1971); Jacksonville Elec. Co. v. Sloan, 52 Fla. 257, 42 So. 516 (1906).
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erty may testify to its value even though he has not been qualified as an
expert.-"
In South Venice Corp. v. Caspersen,89 three witnesses, two of whom
were qualified as experts, testified as to the course of a stream and as to
the location of a certain island in a bay. The lay witness testified that
"we consider this Lemon Bay, yes."40 This testimony was held admissible
and not violative of the opinion rule, even though the witness could not
"swear positively to the fact in question."'"
Finally, the rule in medical malpractice cases 42 that a jury can con-
clude the existence of negligence without the benefit of expert testimony
was applied in a dental malpractice case.43 In that case, however, the
defendant gave sufficient testimony on cross to make a jury finding of
negligence possible.
B. Expert Subject Matter
McCormick states that two elements are required for the use of
expert testimony. First, the subject must be "beyond the ken of the aver-
age layman;" and second, "the witness must have such skill, knowledge or
experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion
or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth." '44 The ken
of the average layman has changed drastically since the general rules
regarding expert subject matter were formulated, and this change has
yielded a corresponding change in the areas where expert knowledge is
admissible. Thus, in Dawson v. Johnson,45 expert testimony was per-
mitted concerning the pasturing of horses, apparently on the theory that
such a matter was not within the scope of the knowledge of a Dade
County trial jury. Similarly, expert testimony has been introduced to
show that a particular shotgun was defective. 46 Earlier, either of these
areas might have been found to be within the province of the jury.
Closer to the current dividing line is Alton Box Board Co. v. Pan-
tya,4 7 an air pollution damage case. Lay testimony was permitted con-
cerning effects of air pollution on buildings as well as on humans. This
testimony was held to be sufficient to allow jury consideration of the
issue of pollution damage in light of other visual proof presented of the
plant's smoke emission. The court applied the rule that the question of
38. Hill v. Marion County, 238 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). The general rule on
value testimony is stated in Salvage & Surplus, Inc. v. Weintraub, 131 So.2d 515 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1961).
39. 229 So.2d 652 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
40. Id. at 655.
41. Id. at 656.
42. Michaels v. Spiers, 144 So.2d 835 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). But see Foster v. Thornton,
125 Fla. 699, 170 So. 459 (1936).
43. Furnari v. Lurie, 242 So.2d 742 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
44. C. McCoRmicK, LAW OF EVIDENCE 28-29 (1954).
45. 226 So.2d 445 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
46. Continental Cas. Co. v. McClure, 225 So.2d 590 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
47. 236 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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when expert testimony is required is determined by the issues involved.
A condemnation decision presented an analogous factual situation. In
Ragland v. State Department of Transportation,48 an expert on environ-
ment and population who styled himself a "plant toxonomist" and "hu-
man ecologist" testified concerning the effects of a proposed interstate
highway interchange. His testimony ran rather far afield, but the trial
court heard it and the appellate court acquiesced.
In Crosby v. State,49 a state beverage agent was permitted to testify,
apparently as an expert, on various types of stills. Similarly, during the
survey period, expert testimony relating to custom and usage in inter-
preting an insurance policy5° and on procedures involved in packing and
shipping furniture5 was permitted.
In Wolk v. Buch,5 2 a slip and fall case allegedly resulting from negli-
gence in selection of sidewalk paint and allowing the growth of a fungus on
a sidewalk, expert testimony was permitted to show that first, the walk-
way was slippery, and second, that the condition was not obvious. The
case is susceptible of two interpretations. If the witness was testifying
that a certain fungus was slippery and transparent, or of the same color
as the sidewalk, the testimony probably relates to an expert subject
matter. If, on the other hand, the witness was testifying that a certain
sidewalk was slippery and dangerous, the testimony probably was "within
the ken of the average layman.""
In Johnson v. Hatoum,54 the plaintiff offered the affidavit of a "quali-
fied safety expert" in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. The
affidavit concluded that pedestrians in a certain drive-in restaurant were
subject to an unreasonable risk of injury, and that the design of the
premises did not meet the standard of care required. The affidavit was
held to have been properly considered in opposition to the motion, and
it seems that this area is one requiring expert treatment.
The requirement of expertise in the subject matter is also susceptible
of misunderstanding. The problem is largely one of defining the subject
matter. Thus, in Ashburn v. Fox,55 medical experts and medical doctors
testified to the standard of care required of an osteopath in diagnosing
cancer. The usual rule dealing with the standard of professional medical
48. 242 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
49. 237 So.2d 286 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
50. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Loxahatchee Marina Inc., 236 So.2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
The court did not discuss any first hand knowledge which the expert might have possessed
of "customer usage," nor did it view the evidence as presenting a hearsay problem.
51. Terminal Transp. Co. v. Lamtron Indus. Inc., 233 So.2d 854 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970),
cert. denied, 238 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1970). The court also stated that this witness' testimony
was more credible than lay testimony on the issue of delivery to a motor carrier in good
condition. On this latter point, compare the instant case with Maas Bros., Inc. v. Bishop,
204 So.2d 16 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
52. 231 So.2d 228 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
53. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
54. 239 So.2d 22 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. dismissed, 244 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1971).
55. 233 So.2d 840 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. dismissed, 242 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1971).
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conduct allows physicians of other schools or experts in other lines to
testify to "principles of the schools [which] do or should concur."56
Opinions on intoxication seem to present special problems. The most fre-
quent means of proof of intoxication in prosecutions for "driving under
the influence" seem to be the opinion of the arresting officer. In City of
Orlando v. Newell," an officer who had also testified to the "acts, con-
duct, appearance and statements""8 gave an opinion on intoxication
which was held to have been properly admitted.59
During the biennium, two cases dealt with what the court considered
to be non-expert subject matter. The first case involved the meaning of
a "No Parking Any Time" sign. The refusal by the trial court to permit
expert testimony was based on the rule that expert testimony is not ac-
ceptable on a question of domestic law, and also because the meaning of
such a sign was within the ordinary experience of a jury.6" The second
case involved a question of whether certain magazines were obscene. The
court stated that: "There was no need, therefore, for the testimony of
witnesses that the magazines are obscene under the standards recognized
in the Roth case . . . ."' This language might be interpreted as holding
that such testimony is acceptable but not necessary. It is submitted, how-
ever, that if the matter is fully considered, the conclusion is inevitable
that this is not subject matter requiring expert testimony.
C. Requirement of Certainty
Although there is no requirement that an expert state an opinion
with absolute certainty, there is a well recognized tendency to reject
opinions based on conjecture and speculation. In an eminent domain
proceeding, an expert on real estate values gave testimony based on gen-
eral estimates. When cross examined regarding the basis of his opinion,
he resorted to responses such as "I can't tell you." On appeal it was held
that the expert's testimony should have been rejected as speculative and
conjectural, and that a jury verdict based on whole or in part on such
speculation should be rejected. The appellate decision was based on the
theory that there must be some avenue open to refute the expert's testi-
mony, and this particular testimony was so indefinite and conjectural
as to be unsusceptible to rebuttal.62 Another rather interesting case on
the same problem was Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Manufacturing Co.68
56. Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 705, 170 So. 459, 463 (1939).
57. 232 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
58. Id.
59. See also State v. Liefert, 247 So.2d 18 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971); City of Orlando v.
Ford, 220 So.2d 661 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
60. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rainy, 238 So.2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert.
denied, 240 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1970).
61. Collins v. State Beverage Dept., 239 So.2d 613, 616 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), citing
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
62. Walters v. State Road Dept., 239 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
63. 238 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 242 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1970).
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wherein an expert testified to the construction of a "bobcat" front end
loader which had been involved in a fire in the plaintiff's mill. The expert
testified to the structure of the fuel feed system and how he thought the
fire had started. Unfortunately, several tests failed to substantiate his
theory of causation. The court ruled that the testimony was so specula-
tive and conjectural as to be insufficient to support a verdict. The ruling
appears to be correct since the expert appeared to offer nothing more
than educated guesses as to the cause of the fire.
In the area of psychiatry and medicine, a "highly conjectural" opin-
ion that an injury could have been the result of a certain event was
placed in the category of "non-evidence. '64 Similarly, in another case,
a deposition of a psychiatrist, which was based on certain test results,
was excluded. Two examining physicians had testified and neither had
used the tests in question. The deponent had also admitted that these
tests were unreliable. The exclusion of the deposition which was based
largely on these tests was upheld. 5
Although related to the problem of proof of intoxication previously
discussed, the decision in Rivers v. Conger Life Insurance Co.6 may
be profitably compared with the "conjecture" decisions. On the issue
of intoxication, a surgeon was allowed to testify that he smelled alcohol
on a deceased's breath. No chemical tests were taken and on cross-ex-
amination the doctor testified that "one beer smells the same as twenty
beers. '6 7 The evidence was held insufficient to prove intoxication, but
the question remains as to whether an opinion that the deceased was
intoxicated could be admitted on the same basis. Such an opinion should
be unacceptable, yet the doctor probably had as much information as
the average arresting officer whose opinion usually is admissible.6
D. Form of Questions
Questions to an expert require a basis in the evidence presented.
Therefore, proof that a defendant was fingerprinted is an essential part
of the predicate for a fingerprint identification. 9 Apparently, the proof
of fingerprinting must be made by the person who took the fingerprints. °
Since an expert opinion is generally elicited by the hypothetical
question, 71 a continuing problem with the hypothetical question con-
cerns what may properly be included in such a question. Generally,
a hypothetical question cannot assume facts not in evidence.72 However,
64. Humphries v. State, 232 So.2d 23 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
65. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Dossey, 246 So.2d 588 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
66. 229 So.2d 625 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
67. Id. at 628.
68. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
69. Rhoden v. State, 227 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
70. Id.
71. See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW or EvIDENCE §§ 15, 16 (1954) ; Spence and Orseck,
Witnesses, in FLORIDA BA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATiON, EvIDENCE IN FLORIDA §§ 4.56-.58
(1971).
72. Arkin Constr. Co. v. Simpkins, 99 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1957).
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in Autrey v. Carroll," a reading of the majority and dissenting opinions
leads to the conclusion that the court's majority sanctioned the use of
an expert's own testimony as part of a hypothetical question put to
him. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that such an opin-
ion was impermissible.74 The facts involved an automobile accident
reconstruction in which an expert had already testified to estimated
speed and reaction time. The hypothetical question asked whether one
automobile had altered its course more than a "reaction" distance from
the point of impact. The question was found to be impermissible due
to the use of the witness' own testimony in the hypothetical question,
which assumed facts not properly in evidence for this purpose. Prac-
tically, the effect of this ruling seems to be that two expert witnesses
will now be required to prove what counsel in Autrey had sought to
prove with one. Whether this is conducive to the efficient administra-
tion of justice, particularly as applied to these facts, is questionable.
In Collins v. State,75 a defendant responded to Miranda warnings
by stating, "I know, I guess I will have to get a lawyer." This state-
ment was included in a hypothetical question put to an expert witness
on the issue of the defendant's sanity. The expert's responses were said
to reveal the "state of mind of the appellant at the time made, as it
might bear on the question of his sanity.' 70
E. Procedures
Normally, depositions of expert witnesses may be admitted without
the showing that is essential for the admission of other depositions.77
In Hall v. Haldane,78 a deposition of a treating physician was admitted
without a showing that the witness was unavailable, even though the
deposition notice did not contain a statement that it was being taken
pursuant to the rules. The pivotal fact was that the defendant who ob-
jected had taken the deposition and had given the defective notice.
The cost of the expert witness' time in preparation of opinion testi-
mony has been held taxable as costs. 79
The function of the court when expert testimony is involved has re-
cently been restated. In State Department of Transportation v. Myers,80
engineers testified to the need for condemning and taking land to an
interchange. The court stated that:
We do not conceive it to be the proper function of the court
to pit its judgment on highly technical engineering problems
73. 227 So.2d 697 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Autrey].
74. Autrey v. Carroll, 240 So.2d 474 (Fla. 1970).
75. 227 So.2d 538 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
76. Id. at 539.
77. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.390.
78. 243 So.2d 571 (Fla. 1971).
79. Conboy v. City of Naples, 230 So.2d 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). See FLA. STAT.
§ 90.231(2) (1969).
80. 237 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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against that of engineering experts employed for the purpose of
designing state highways, structures, and facilities .... If ex-
pert testimony on the issue of necessity was in dispute, the
court would be authorized to reconcile the conflicts and to ac-
cept that testimony deemed to be the most credible and reason-
able."'
The reviewing court was careful to point out that the trial court can-
not reject expert testimony unless it is so incredible, illogical, or un-
reasonable as to be unworthy of belief. Its ruling did not affect the
corollary proposition that if the matter on which the expert testifies is
within the province of the jury, the conclusions to be drawn are left
to the jury.82
IV. IMPEACI-HMENT AND OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING CREDIBILITY
Factors which affect the credibility of a witness may be brought
forth in several ways.88 Perhaps the most obvious way of attacking
credibility is by proving that the witness has some interest in giving
the particular testimony under attack. Thus, in Sweet v. State, 4 an
investigator from the Florida Bureau of Law Enforcement had given
testimony damaging to the defense. The agent denied having any ro-
mantic interest in one of the other witnesses, denied having had sexual
relations with her, and denied receiving money from her. On cross-ex-
amination of the other witness, a proffer was made of testimony directly
contrary to the previous statements of the agent. The reviewing court
held that such cross-examination was permitted as a matter of right
and mentioned that a wide range of inquiry should be permitted.
Before a witness is subject to impeachment, however, he must give
testimony which is damaging to the party seeking to impeach the wit-
ness. In Oliver v. State,8" the state was allowed to impeach a court
witness with prior inconsistent statements before the witness had given
any testimony adverse to the prosecution or favorable to the defense.
The witness had claimed to know nothing, and the state attorney read
the witness' sworn pretrial statements to "refresh his memory." The
appellate court found the procedure erroneous.8 6 The procedure in Oli-
ver was distinguished by the same appellate court in Sutton v. State.
8 7
There, the court had called a witness who had "gone bad" at a pretrial
hearing. The witness was impeached by testimony from the defendant's
81. Id. at 261.
82. Id.
83. See C. McCoNIcy, LAW OF EvIDENcE §§ 33-47 (1954).
84. 235 So.2d 40 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 239 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1970).
85. 239 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 250 So.2d 888 (Fla.
1971) [hereinafter cited in text as Oliver]. The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the
disposition of the impeachment point, id. at 890.
86. See also Rankin v. State, 143 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1962).
87. 239 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Sutton].
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first trial, and the impeachment was held to be within the court's dis-
cretion. Sutton seems largely based on decisions which hold that the
state can impeach a witness who "goes bad." For example, in Bogan v.
State,8  the prosecutor was allowed to impeach a witness who had been
granted immunity when he surprised the prosecutor by offering testi-
mony which was different from his pretrial statement. Apparently, the
prosecutor might also have been able to impeach the witness if he had
changed his testimony to a simple failure to recall. 8
Although it is generally held that statements used to impeach a
witness do not come in for the truth of the matter contained in them,
90
the rule seems to have been violated at least once recently. In Salter v.
State,91 a robbery prosecution, the state called one eyewitness while
the defendant took the stand and called two alibi witnesses. The state
cross-examined the defendant and one of the alibi witnesses regarding
statements made by the other alibi witness. The witness who had made
the statements did not testify. In a per curiam opinion, the procedure
was held to be harmless. It seems that the statements must have come
in for their truth, and if so, it seems that this decision represents an
example of the law of evidence being transmogrified by the "harmless
error" statute.
92
The statements admitted in Salter also lacked a predicate necessary
for admission. This requirement was reiterated in Merrill v. State. 3
In Merrill a hotel manager testified that he did not know that book-
making was going on at the hotel. On rebuttal, the state sought to im-
peach the manager by showing that he had made prior inconsistent
statements about his knowledge of the bookmaking. The reviewing court
held that this procedure was impermissible because no predicate had
been laid on the prior examination of the witness sought to be im-
peached.94
Impeachment during the presentation of rebuttal testimony is, of
course, permissible. In a civil suit for assault and battery, the defendant
pleaded the affirmative defense of self-defense. Rebuttal evidence which
showed that the plaintiff was missing a thumb at the time of the alter-
cation was held acceptable. This evidence was introduced to disprove
the defendant's version that plaintiff had attacked him by choking him
with both hands at the throat. The evidence was admitted, not in sup-
88. 226 So.2d 110 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
89. See Beckton v. State, 227 So.2d 223 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969), discussed in Part II
supra.
90. C. McCoRmIcK, LAW oF EVIDENCE § 39 (1954).
91. 226 So.2d 230 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Salter].
92. FLA. STAT. § 924.33 (1969).
93. 228 So.2d 305 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. dismissed, 239 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1970).
94. A foundation or predicate is required by FLA. STAT. § 90.10 (1969). This require-
ment is also a part of the general common law of evidence. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 37 (1954).
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port of the plaintiff's case in chief, but in rebuttal of the defendant's
affirmative defense. 9
5
An expert witness may be impeached by a showing of an incon-
sistent expert opinion. Thus, in Langston v. City of Miami Beach,9 6
the "value" testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness in an eminent do-
main proceeding was held impeachable by other "value" testimony which
was "given at another time and place .197
A witness may also be impeached by a showing of a conviction of
a crime.98 The Florida view is that the conviction need not be for an
"infamous" crime or even for a crime involving "moral turpitude."9
Thus, the showing that a witness to a traffic accident has been con-
victed of assault and battery has been permitted.'00 It has also been
recognized that a comment by the prosecutor that the defendant had
"spent the better part of his life in jail" was prejudicial despite the
fact that the defendant had admitted two felony convictions and num-
berous arrests for drunkenness. 101
In Ilaslett v. State,'0 the defendant made three different state-
ments regarding a shortage of funds in the county clerk's office. The
court held that the statements were admissible and were not impeach-
ment. The court stated that:
The evidence was used to show inconsistent statements on
Haslett's part and to show guilty knowledge. In three instances
he had stated he took the money represented by the three
checks to cover the missing funds, but the checks were drawn
on March 6th and 7th and he said the funds were not missing
until March 8th.'
It seems that the versions were being used for impeachment, but the
court refused to characterize the testimony as impeachment since such
a characterization would prevent the statements from being received
for the truth of the matters contained therein.'
Another impeachment decision which is consistent with the weight of
authority is Yanzito v. Wagner.15 The plaintiff in that case had been
involved in an automobile accident and offered one version of testi-
mony on direct and gave another version on cross which was at some
variance with his prior deposition. On redirect examination, it was held
to be proper to refuse the plaintiff's request to read the deposition to
95. Johns v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 226 So.2d 403 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
96. 242 So.2d 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
97. Id. at 483.
98. C. McCoRMicx, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43 (1954).
99. C. ALLOWAY, FLORIDA EVIDENCE CASEBOOK pt. II, 22 (1971).
100. See Franklin v. Dade County, 230 So.2d 730 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
101. Fitzgerald v. State, 227 So.2d 45 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
102. 225 So.2d 186 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
103. Id. at 192.
104. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
105. 244 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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the jury even though it "more accurately expressed the recollection of
the minor plaintiff."'1 6 The deposition would seem to be inadmissible
under any of the rules governing depositions. 0 It certainly was not
proper impeachment, and even if it were, the deposition should not have
been read to the jury to show the truth of the matters it contained
after the deponent had testified and was available to testify again.
V. COMPETENCY AND PRIVILEGES
A. Children
"When a child of tender years is offered as a witness, it is the
court's duty, and its general practice, to examine the child to ascertain
his competence to testify."'0l In Miller v. State,'19 a child of seven
years, who "didn't know what was meant by swearing on the Bible,"" 0
was not allowed to testify. Although the point was not assigned as er-
ror, and the appellate court did not pass on it, it appears that the in-
quiry into the child's competency to testify was inadequate."' Another
child witness, a ten-year-old, was called in Grech v. State."2 The wit-
ness prefaced her statements with "I think" or "I believe." It was held
that she did not offer speculative or uncertain testimony and was other-
wise competent to testify.
A rule was also established concerning the testimony of adult chil-
dren in a divorce proceeding. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that a trial court's refusal to force a couple's twenty-
three-year old son to respond to questions about an allegedly meretri-
cious relationship of his father was error. The rule appears to be that
the testimony of adult children must be admitted in a divorce action
if the testimony is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise admissible."'
B. Settlement Offers
Offers to compromise or settle claims are generally excluded on
the basis of a strong public policy favoring out of court settlements. 14 Dur-
ing the survey, the strength of this prohibition was reaffirmed. In an
action by a bus passenger against a county bus operator, evidence of
a settlement with another bus passenger came in and an objection was
made. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury
106. Id. at 762.
107. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280-1.340.
108. C. ALLOWAY, FLORIDA EVIDENCE CASEBOOK pt. II, 3 (1971).
109. 233 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
110. Id. at 449.
111. See Bell v. State, 93 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1957). "The prime test of testimonial com-
petency of a young child is his intelligence rather than his age. In addition the witness
should possess some obligation to tell the truth." Id. at 577.
112. 243 So.2d 216 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 247 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1971).
113. Spencer v. Spencer, 242 So.2d 786 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 248 So.2d 169
(Fla. 1971).
114. Jordan v. City of Coral Gables, 191 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1966).
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to disregard the statement. Later in the same trial, a county investiga-
tor testified that he had admitted liability during settlement negotia-
tions. The statement was admitted, but later stricken, and the jury was
admonished to disregard it. On appeal, it was held that the cautionary
instructions did not cure the error. Strong public policy keeps these
matters out of the realm of the jury's deliberative knowledge. Hence,
the verdict was not reached in a "laboratory atmosphere" uncontami-
nated by matters which public policy keeps out. n 5
In a suit on a marine insurance policy, the insurer attempted to
discover facts involved in a settlement of a claim against the manufac-
turer of an insured yacht. It was held that such negotiations were be-
yond the scope of discovery and that admission of such evidence was
"generally not permitted.""' Apparently, however, this doctrine of ex-
clusion has no application in criminal proceedings. In Sweet v. State,"
an investigator from the Florida Bureau of Law Enforcement was al-
lowed to testify that a defendant charged with murder in the first degree
had offered to plead guilty to some lesser crime. Allowing this testimony
seems indefensible if one recalls the congestion in the criminal courts.
The public policy favoring "plea bargaining" would appear to be at
least as strong as the policy favoring settlement of tort claims. Further,
there seems to be no ground for admitting this evidence in a criminal
proceeding unless the defendant takes the stand to deny his guilt." 8
C. Psychiatrists and Psychologists
Psychiatrists and psychologists have a statutory privilege to protect
their confidential professional communications with their patients." 9 The
breadth of this privilege was tested twice during the period under sur-
vey. In Yoho v. Lindsley,120 discovery was sought from a treating psy-
chiatrist. 2 ' In denying discovery, the court held that the fact that
plaintiff had introduced the element of mental suffering in her claim
for damages did not automatically invite inquiry into all past communi-
cations with her psychiatrist. The burden was placed on the party seek-
ing to depose the psychiatrist to demonstrate that the plaintiff's mental
condition had, in fact, been introduced. Inquiry is thus limited by the
relevancy of the material being sought, and protective orders may be
imposed.'22 The privilege for psychiatrist-patient communications is more
115. Dade County v. Clarson, 240 So.2d 828 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
116. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flitman, 234 So.2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
117. 235 So.2d 40 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 239 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1970).
118. Cf. Harris v. New York, 91 S. Ct. 643 (1971). But cf. State v. Galasso, 217 So.2d
326 (Fla. 1968); Young v. State, 234 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1970). See Note, 25 U. MIAMi L.
REv. 531 (1971).
119. FLA. STAT. § 90.242 (1969) and FLA. STAT. § 490.32 (Supp. 1970). See also section
XIII infra.
120. 248 So.2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
121. For a discussion of the importance of the distinction between treating and examining
physicians, see C. McCoRmcK, LAW OF EVMENCE §§ 266-67 (1954).
122. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b).
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strictly controlled in criminal proceedings. The Florida rules of criminal
procedure control the procedure for pleading defenses of mental con-
dition and for appointing psychiatric examiners." 3 Thus, a psychiatrist
appointed to examine a rape defendant has been granted a limited privi-
lege to refuse disclosure of communications at trial. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, has stated that: "It is not proper for a psy-
chiartist to repeat at trial the interrogation of the accused taken during
his mental examination. To do so may be error."'24
The scope of the information available to the psychiatrist and its
later admission at trial attracted the attention of the Supreme Court
of Florida in Parkin v. State.25 In that case, a criminal defendant
interposed the defense of insanity, and the trial court appointed two
experts to examine the defendant. At the hearing before the psychia-
trists, the defendant sought to invoke his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The trial court ordered the defendant to co-
operate under pain of having his evidence of insanity excluded at trial.
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court and held that the
experts appointed under this rule are neutral experts, and therefore,
may be examined by both sides. In some interesting dicta, the court
stated that if a defendant makes admissions and is subsequently found
sane, the admissions may be used by the prosecution if the matters are
opened up by the defendant. The court also stated that the statements
obtained from the patient are evidence of mental condition only and
are not evidence of the factual truth of the matters contained therein.
These two statements of dicta seem to contain some degree of internal
inconsistency.
D. Attorney-Client
The problem of the attorney who becomes a witness for his client
arose twice during the period under survey. In Hubbard v. Hubbard,'26
the court held that an attorney who testified for his client in a divorce
proceeding was not entitled to an attorney's fee. Such a course of con-
duct was held to be a breach of Canon 19.127 Another case held that an
attorney who becomes a witness loses his right to a fee under a con-
tingent fee contract.128
In Schetter v. Schetter,129 an attorney taperecorded a conversation
123. See FLA. R. CRam. P. 1.210. See also FLA. STAT. § 90.242 (1969); FLA. STAT.
§ 490.32(2)(a) (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. § 909.17 (1969).
124. Richardson v. State, 248 So.2d 530, 531 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). Query-whether the
inclusion of the phrase, "may be error," is significant?
125. 238 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 1189 (1971).
126. 233 So.2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). [Subsequent to the period under survey, the
Supreme Court of Florida took what appears to be a contrary position in Hill v. Douglass,
No. 41,241 (Fla. filed March 1, 1972), rev'g 248 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).]
127. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETrIcs No. 19.
128. Hill v. Douglass, 248 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), rev'd, No. 41,241 (Fla. filed
March 1, 1972).
129. 239 So.2d 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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with a defendant. At the end of the conversation the attorney told the
defendant that he had recorded the conversation. However, the attorney,
without the defendant's permission, subsequently gave the recording to
a psychiatrist to determine the defendant's mental condition. The at-
torney-client privilege was held applicable, and the court stated the rule
that it is error to permit a third party to give expert testimony based on a
recording of a communication if the original communication is privileged.
This privilege of the communication is not absolute, however. It
has been held that an attorney may reveal communications with a client
when the attorney has been accused of wrongful conduct. The revela-
tion may be made when the information sought is necessary to deter-
mine whether an attorney's conduct was wrongful. 180
In a case which defies classification, a facet of the attorney-client
privilege was discussed. In Grand Union Co. v. Patrick,' an insured's
report to his insurer was held privileged. Since the purpose of the re-
port was to aid the defense of an impending suit, it had the effect of
a communication between attorney and client. The effect of this decision
may be to extend protection to a communication which one reasonably
believes will be relayed to an attorney who is preparing for a suit. How-
ever, this type of report also bears a generic resemblance to the pro-
tected accident report.1 2
E. Work Product
The work product doctrine originated in the leading case of Hick-
man v. Taylor. 8 Since the doctrine's birth, it has become the source
of a number of distinct evidentiary privileges unrelated to its attorney-
client genesis. During the period under survey, the protection of the
privilege was apparently extended to police officers.'8 4
The work product doctrine also took on a new dimension in the
area of eminent domain proceedings. The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that an appraiser, hired by an attorney for a con-
demnee, could not be deposed and examined at trial as his findings were
part of the attorney's work product.' The district court certified the
question as one of great public interest in light of a previous decision
permitting discovery of similar information gained by the condemnor.'8 6
On review, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the work product
130. Wilson v. Wainwright, 248 So.2d 249 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). The attorney involved
was a public defender. Therefore, the rule may be extended to court-appointed counsel.
131. 247 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
132. FLA. STAT. §§ 317.171, 186.08 (1969), discussed in section IX infra.
133. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The doctrine was adopted in Florida in 1949 in Atlantic C.L.
R.R. v. Allen, 40 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1949).
134. Darrigo v. State, 243 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). Although the court used the
term "policeman's work product," it is submitted that there really is no such thing, and
the term was coined as a convenient way to limit discovery of the policeman's personal
notes. See Dade County v. Monroe, 237 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
135. Carlson v. Pinellas County, 227 So.2d 703 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
136. Shell v. State Road Dept., 135 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1962).
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of the condemnee was not discoverable in the absence of an attempt
by the condemnee to discover the work product of the condemnor. 87
The supreme court intimated that the work product would be discover-
able if discovery was mutual. Such mutual discovery in an eminent
domain proceeding was undertaken and upheld in Corbett Motor Sup-
ply, Inc. v. City of Orlando. 8 Thus the rule of mutuality of discovery
seems firmly established in the area of eminent domain.
In Surf Drugs v. Vermette 39 the court further defined the scope
of the work product exception from discovery. The Supreme Court of
Florida held that a deponent may be required to respond with names
and addresses of persons having relevant information and to state gen-
erally what that information is.
The criminal law field also yielded a decision defining the scope
of discovery of an attorney's work product. In State v. Gillespie,'140 per-
missible discovery by the defense was held to include the prosecution's
work product if the work product is actually evidence and not merely
summaries or condensations of evidence.
F. Immunity from Prosecution
Florida Statutes section 932.29 (1969) allows the grant of immunity
from prosecution for the purpose of gaining evidence for the prosecution
of other offenders. During the period under survey, the Supreme Court of
Florida overruled a line of cases which held that section 932.29 could
protect witnesses from loss of employment or a government license.' In
Headley v. Baron,42 the court held that the statute covered only im-
munity from prosecution and did protect against a police captain's sus-
pension from employment. Following this decision, the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, held that the grant of immunity does not prevent
a real estate board from revoking a witness' real estate license. 43
G. Informers
The identity of an informer who furnishes information about the
commission of a crime is generally privileged.' 4 This privilege is un-
doubtedly based on the practical view that without it, few, if any, in-
formers would come forward. An exception to this privilege was recognized
137. Pinellas County v. Carlson, 242 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1971).
138. 245 So.2d 93 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
139. 236 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1970). See also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b).
140. 227 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). See also FLA. R. CRim. P. 1.220.
141. State Bd. of Architecture v. Seymour, 62 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1952) ; Hotel & Restaurant
Comm'n v. Zucker, 116 So.2d 642 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959); State Beverage Dept. v. Zucker, 116
So.2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
142. 228 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1969). But see Englander v. State, 246 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1971)
(waiver of immunity by county official under charter that provides that failure to waive
immunity results in loss of job is deemed to be an involuntary waiver).
143. Roose v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 239 So.2d 510 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
144. Treverrow v. State, 194 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1967); Garcia v. State, 110 So.2d 709
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
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in Monserrate v. State.145 In that case, dealing with the sale and posses-
sion of dangerous drugs, the defendant took the stand and directly denied
having drugs. Since the informer had been with a police detective at the
time of the alleged sale, the court ordered that the informer's name be
produced. Therefore, the rule of this case would seem to be limited to
situations where an informer is present during a transaction which results
in a fact particularly in issue.
H. Witness Lists
The exchange of witness lists is provided for by the Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure. 4 ' In a case which apparently also involved "crea-
tive" plaintiff selection, 47 a codefendant pled guilty, and the state then
sought to offer him as a witness at the defendant's trial. An objection was
made on the basis that the codefendant was not on the proposed witness
list furnished by the state. The codefendant's plea came after the ex-
change of witness lists, and it was held that he should be permitted to
testify. The court also mentioned that the defense knew of the code-
fendant's plea on the morning of the trial and had ample time to depose
or interview him. 48
I. "The Rule"
The effect of invoking the rule on sequestering witnesses 49 has gen-
erally been to exclude witnesses from the courtroom while other witnesses
are testifying. It has been suggested that the rule does not apply to par-
ties or parents of minor parties.' ° In Pieze v. State,' however, the de-
fense unqualifiedly invoked the rule. This invocation was held to be a
waiver of the right to call witnesses still in the courtroom, including the
mother of the nineteen-year-old defendant.
J. Self-Incrimination
A conflict had existed between the district courts of appeal of Flo-
rida on the question of whether a party in a divorce action could invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination and still maintain a suit for di-
vorce. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, had answered the
question in the affirmative 52 while the District Court of Appeal, Second
145. 232 So.2d 444 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
146. The exchange of witness lists and the sanctions for failure to exchange lists are
covered by the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FLA. R. CaM. P. 1.220; FLA.
STAT. § 906.29 (1969).
147. Miranda v. State, 237 So.2d 228 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
148. The decision seems to assume that hasty preparation is the norm, and its logical
result might be to encourage it. Query-could the defense really have gotten "same day
service" on such a deposition?
149. See Robinson v. State, 80 Fla. 736, 87 So. 61 (1920).
150. C. ALLOWAY, FLORmA EVIDENCE CASEBOOK pt. II, 9 (1971).
151. 243 So.2d 442 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
152. Simkins v. Simkins, 219 So.2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), cert. dismissed, 225 So.2d
916 (Fla. 1969).
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District, had answered in the negative.'53 On review, the Supreme Court
of Florida upheld the view of the second district.' Now a spouse who
invokes the privilege against self-incrimination will have his complaint
dismissed. This decision of the supreme court has been followed.. in a
case arising under the old "fault based" divorce statute, but the problem
probably will disappear from the divorce area with the advent of "no
fault" divorce. The rule seems applicable to other situations, however,
and it appears that a plaintiff or defendant who invokes the privilege
against self-incrimination may still have his claim or counterclaim dis-
missed.
K. Insurance
Since the decision of Shingleton v. Bussey,'56 which permitted direct
action against an insurance carrier and Beta Eta House Corp. v. Greg-
ory'17 which permitted severance for separate trials, the problem of the
admissibility of insurance limits has been a continuing feature of the
Southern Reporter Advance Sheets. Before Shingleton and Beta Eta, it
was comparatively well settled that such evidence was inadmissible and
that its admission constituted reversible error. 8 In fact, Beta Eta inti-
mated that its admission would still be error. 9 Cases decided since
Shingleton and Beta Eta, indicate that these rules regarding the mention
of insurance are still in force. However, in Sutton v. Gomez, °60 an inquiry
of a venireman on voir dire about interest in insurers elicited a defense
motion for a mistrial. The motion was held properly denied, and the
grant of a new trial on this basis was reversed.
In Vilford v. Jenkins, 6' the court held that Shingleton gives the
plaintiff the right to discover the name of the defendant's malpractice
carrier. In Porto v. Khan,"6 2 the district court refused to review on cer-
tiorari the grant of a mistrial for the mention of insurance. Although the
decision could be explained on procedural grounds, it appears to have
substantive overtones. In Futch v. Josey,163 the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that the admission of insurance policy limits is
153. Minor v. Minor, 232 So.2d 746 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
154. Minor v. Minor, 240 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1970).
155. Simonet v. Simonet, 241 So.2d 720 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). See Fla. Laws 1971,
ch. 71-241, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 61.011, 61.021, 61.031, 61.061, 61.071, 61.08, 61.09,
61.10, 61.11, 61.12, 61.13, 61.14, 61.16, 61.17, 61.18, 61.19 (1969); adding FLA. STAT.
§§ 61.043, 61.044, 61.052; repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 61.041, 61.042, 61.051, 61.15 (1969).
156. 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
157. 230 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), aff'd, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
158. Carls Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1953).
159. At least the district court opinion so stated. See note 157 supra.
160. 234 So.2d 725 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
161. 240 So.2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
162. 242 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
163. 247 So.2d 491 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). Millitello v. Guest, 248 So.2d 662 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1971) seems to hold the same thing. Subsequent to the submission of this survey two
cases have been decided indicating that the error may be harmless. Stecher v. Pomeroy,
253 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1971); Josey v. Futch, 254 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1971).
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reversible error. In light of the previous decisions, it appears that direct
action against an insurer in Florida operates as a device to promote dis-
covery, and that the mention of insurance at a trial on the merits may
still be an invitation to a mistrial.
L. Identification of Persons
Identification of persons and bodies seems to present unique prob-
lems closely related to competency and privileges. It has been recognized
that the identification of a body by a near relative is not a preferred
means of proving identity at trial.' One decision, while citing with ap-
proval the doctrine that it is prejudicial to allow members of a decedent's
family to identify the deceased at trial, also held that the state need not
demonstrate to the court that no other witnesses, save members of the
family, are available before allowing a family member to make the iden-
tification. 165 A related case held that it was not error to allow the mother
of a rape prosecutrix to present evidence showing "outcry.' 1 66 Abram v.
State seems to go the farthest in this direction.'67 In Abram the defense
had offered to stipulate to the identity of a decedent. The victim was
identified by a brother and the refusal to stipulate was upheld. The court
mentioned that the prosecution could not be deprived of the "legitimate
moral force" of its evidence. This holding seems at variance with the
previous rule on family member identifications and seems particularly
deleterious when identity is not actually at issue.
Regardless of who makes the identification, some predicate estab-
lishing that the witness knew the identity of a decedent is essential. Thus,
in Terzado v. State,6 " the court held that testimony concerning the iden-
tity of a decedent had to be predicated upon some showing that the
witness saw or recognized the body or identified the deceased by other
means. For purposes of identification, testimony which merely states the
name of the victim was held insufficient. Murphy v. State69 goes further
and holds that identification of a victim requires more of a predicate
than a simple statement that the witness had knowledge of the deceased's
identity. Some of the additional requirements may be gleaned from Ricks
v. State, 70 where the court held that the predicate for identification of
a patient by a physician could be proved by circumstantial evidence. The
court stated that: "[i]dentity may be shown by other facts and circum-
stances.''
164. Ashmore v. State, 214 So.2d 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968); Hathaway v. State, 100
So.2d 662 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
165. Furr v. State, 229 So.2d 269 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
166. Roundtree v. State, 229 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), appeal dismissed, 242
So.2d 136 (Fla. 1970).
167. 242 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 245 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1971). On
stipulations generally, see Arrington v. State, 233 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1970).
168. 232 So.2d 232 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
169. 240 So.2d 854 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
170. 242 So.2d 763 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
171. Id. at 765.
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VI. RELEVANCY AND MATERIALITY
A. Materiality
Although the distinction between relevancy and materialty is often
hard to draw, certain problems more clearly fall into one category rather
than the other. McCormick defines materiality in a negative manner.
If the evidence is offered to prove a proposition which is not a
matter in issue nor probative of a matter in issue, the evidence
is properly said to be immaterial. 2
The matters in issue are generally defined by the pleadings." 8 Therefore,
what is material is generally determined by what can be proven under a
given set of pleadings. In addition, the fact that an issue may be tried
with the consent of the parties does not automatically make that issue
material. In Worth Insurance Co. v. Gammons,'74 the trial court struck
the defendant's affirmative defense of lack of consent required by the
insurance policy. Nevertheless, evidence of the consent came in. This
evidence was held to be "irrelevant and immaterial" because it did not
create an issue tried with the express or implied consent of the parties.'
In Lisbon Holding & Investment Co. v. Village Apartments Inc.,.76
evidence of latent defects in the property which was the subject of the
suit was held to have been properly excluded when no allegation of fraud
was made with respect to the quality or condition of the premises. The
court also noted that the plaintiff had made an inspection of the property
which would tend to be inconsistent with any allegation of fraud.
In a slightly different vein, evidence of the vicious nature of the vic-
tim of a murder was held properly excluded until the defendant made
some showing of self-defense' 77
Evidence of the profits of a closely held corporation was admitted
in a tort action commenced by one of the owners. Apparently, the evi-
dence was held harmless because the corporation's loss of earnings was
not a part of the plaintiff's damage claim.' If the corporation's earnings




Relevance, according to McCormick, "is probative worth.""7 Logi-
cally then, something which tends to prove a proposition which is at
172. C. McCoRmICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 152, at 315 (1954). See also Simon v. Simon,
235 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
173. C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 152, at 315 (1954).
174. 228 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
175. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a).
176. 237 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
177. Williams v. State, 238 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
178. Inter-American Transp. Equip. Co. v. Frank, 227 So.2d 699 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
179. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 151, at 314 (1954).
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issue under the pleadings, i.e., materiality, might still be irrelevant if it
does not prove the proposition well enough. Perhaps the best example of
such evidence was the statement by a doctor that a certain person's
breath smelled of alcohol.8 0 The evidence was held insufficient to prove
intoxication because the doctor admitted that "one beer smells like
twenty."'" However, that evidence, though material, was irrelevant since
it tended to prove intoxication, but not well enough to be relevant.
Many other evidence rulings do not fit neatly into either the rele-
vancy or materiality category. For convenience, they have been grouped
under "general relevancy," but the reader with a pedantic bent is urged
to attempt to distinguish between relevancy and materiality. A case
which reflects this blurred distinction is City of Miami v. City of Coral
Gables.'"" There, evidence of the amount of pollutants from other sources
was not admitted in a suit to enjoin the operation of a city incinerator.
On remand, after finding that the incinerator constituted a nuisance, the
trial court refused a proffer of a plan to abate the nuisance.' 8' On appeal
a second time, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, stated that
"[t]he proposed evidence and proffer did not tend to abate the nuisance
and it was appropriate for the trial court to deny same."'8 4
In Brevard County v. Jacks,'85 it was held error to exclude a photo-
graph of a sign which stated: "Swim at Your Own Risk." The photo-
graph was said to be relevant to prove compliance with the defendant's
duty to warn of a dangerous condition. In another action, the pleadings
initially admitted ownership of a motor vehicle, but a subsequent amend-
ment sought to make an issue of ownership. The trial court had refused
a proffer of a title certificate, but the cause was remanded for a "full
day in court."' 86 In another case, notes found on the person of a defen-
dant which were written by a decedent were admitted over the defen-
dant's objection.1 87 The rationale for admission was that "circumstances
cloaked the note with sufficient relevancy to support its entry for the
purpose described [to show] what the [defendant] had on his person at
the time of arrest.' 88s Here the relationship seems tenuous if it was, in
fact, the only reason militating toward admission of the notes.
In Dixon v. State,.. alibi evidence was held to be admissible for
jury consideration even though it fell "short of complete proof of absolute
impossibility of the accused's presence at the alleged time and place of
180. Rivers v. Conger Life Ins. Co., 229 So.2d 625 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
181. Id. at 628.
182. 233 So.2d 7 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
183. See City of Miami v. City of Coral Gables, 240 So.2d 499 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
184. Id. at 500. Query-how can evidence abate a nuisance?
185. 238 So.2d 156 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
186. Skroh v. Newby, 237 So.2d 548, 552 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
187. Williams v. State, 228 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1969).
188. Id. at 379.
189. 227 So.2d 740 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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the act."'190 In so holding, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
rejected a jury instruction which provided that "[t]he proof of an alibi,
to be sufficient, must include and cover the entire time when the presence
of an accused was required to commit the offense charged."'
In Grissom v. State,'9 2 a psychiatrist's testimony which supported
a mental attitude of the defendant which was insufficient to meet the
McNaughton test of insanity'93 was held to have been properly excluded.
But in Megill v. State, 94 a prosecutor's references to the child of a mer-
itricious relationship were held proper because they were relevant to the
issue and the element of premeditation in a prosecution for first degree
murder.
It is clearly proper to move to strike irrelevant testimony. 9 5 In
Harris v. State, 96 the defendant in a first degree murder prosecution had
his entire testimony stricken since the testimony did not relate to the
commission of the crime and, in fact, pertained to matters unrelated to
the crime charged.
2. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES AND HABIT
In what appears to be a case of first impression in Florida, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that evidence of prior
claims is not admissible when it is irrelevant to the particular claim being
litigated. In Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc.,'97 the defendant unsuc-
cessfully sought to introduce evidence of fifteen previous claims by the
plaintiff (nine of which were for personal injury) to show that the plain-
tiff was "litigious." This rejection of unrelated claims comports with the
general rule rejecting such evidence. 98 In Williams v. State,9 9 however,
a robbery victim was permitted to testify that he had been robbed three
or four times in a two year period. The ruling seems questionable and
highly prejudicial. The only thing such evidence might prove was that
the witness was an expert victim. Clearly, the harmful nature of the
testimony would outweigh any probative value that it might have had. 200
In the area of tax assessments, it has been held that each year's tax
assessment must rest on its own bottom, and therefore, a subsequent
year's tax assessment is inadmissible in an action challenging a prior
year's assessment.20'
190. Id. at 743.
191. Id. at 741.
192. 237 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
193. For a discussion of the McNaughton rule and its effectiveness in Florida, see
Campbell v. State, 227 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1969), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970).
194. 231 So.2d 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
195. Platt v. Rowand, 54 Fla. 327, 45 So. 32 (1907).
196. 236 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
197. 227 So.2d 543 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
198. C. McCoRmiCK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 163 (1954).
199. 235 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
200. See Harris v. State, 183 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
201. Hect v. Dade County, 234 So.2d 709 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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In Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Fulmer, °2 evidence of a history
of prior accidents in a certain warehouse was rejected because the details
of the different accidents lacked substantial similarity. The accidents
had occurred on various conveyors in the defendant's building, and the
difference in conveyors was held sufficient to make the evidence inad-
missible. This ruling seems to follow the well accepted general rule of
Jacksonville T. K. W. Ry. v. Peninsular Land, Transportation & Manu-
facturing Co.208 Therein the court recognized that:
Former fires by the same engine are admissible as evidence
tending to prove its defective condition or construction or im-
proper management; and those put out by other engines are ex-
cluded .... 204
In White v. Seaboard C.L. R.R., °5 a plaintiff proffered a survey of
the average speeds at which a number of vehicles crossed the tracks of a
defendant railroad to show the defendant's knowledge of the need for a
signal. The evidence was held to have been properly excluded as irrele-
vant because the plaintiff was under a duty to stop at the railroad cross-
ing.
In an action for damages for breach of a contract to sell real estate,
a second deposit receipt agreement was proffered as reflecting on the
value of the property at the time of the breach. The trial court rejected
the proffer. On appeal, however, it was held that the agreement should
have been admitted. 20 6
A pivotal question in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. American
Liberty Insurance Co.20 7 was whether an insurance binder had been
mailed. The agent testified that binders were always mailed, but had no
recollection of a particular binder being posted. A secretary testified to
substantially the same facts. In refusing to allow the admission of this
type of evidence, the District Court of Appeal, First District, adopted
the majority rule. The court cited the following language from American
Jurisprudence (Second Series): "Evidence of the general habits of a
person is not admissible for the purpose of showing his conduct upon a
specific occasion."20
3. UNCHARGED CRIMES
The rules governing the admissibility of evidence of crimes other
than the one with which a defendant is charged were stated in Williams
v. State.20 9 Prior to Williams, exclusion had been the general rule. After
202. 227 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1969).
203. 27 Fla. 1, 9 So. 661 (1891).
204. Id. at 104, 9 So. at 676.
205. 227 So.2d 227 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
206. Stupner v. Cacace, 231 So.2d 525 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
207. 238 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
208. Id. at 453, quoting 29 Am. JUR. 2d Evidence § 303, at 349 (1969).
209. 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Williams].
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Williams, admissibility became the rule in Florida and exclusion the
exception. During the period of this survey, more than twenty cases were
reported in which evidence of collateral crimes was admitted by the
trial court. Despite comments such as, "[w]e look, however, with jaun-
diced legal eye at subsequently committed extraneous offenses,"210 and
"[gireat diligence is required to save from extinction the rule regarding
propensity [to commit crime as a basis for admitting evidence of other
crimes],""'1 prosecutors seem more and more inclined to introduce such
evidence, and the courts seem less and less inclined to hold it inad-
missible.
During the survey period, a variety of means were used to demon-
strate that a defendant had committed other crimes. In Randall v.
State,212 a prosecution for buying, receiving, or concealing stolen prop-
erty, evidence of a theft of money orders was introduced. The state in-
troduced two witnesses to prove the separate offense, a store owner who
testified that certain money orders had been stolen, and a detective who
testified that he found the money orders in the defendant's truck after
arresting him on an unspecified charge. Since this evidence was inade-
quate to gain a conviction in a trial for theft of the money orders, the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, held it inadmissible in the
prosecution for receiving stolen goods. The court found it irrelevant and
without probative value.
It is clear, however, that evidence of a collateral crime need not be
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of that collateral crime to be ad-
missible at a later trial.
In Crosby v. State,2"' the principal crime charged was possession of
"moonshine" and possession of distilling apparatus. A state beverage
agent testified that he had arrested the defendant six years previously
for operating the same type of still. The remoteness of the arrest was
argued but the court held that remoteness alone is an insufficient ground
for exclusion of the evidence of a collateral crime. In Mims v. State 214
evidence of an attempted crime came in under the Williams rule. The
defendant was charged with rape, and evidence that the defendant had
accosted another woman in a manner similar to the crime charged was
admitted even though the earlier attempt had failed.
In Saxon v. State,2"5 a medical examiner, while testifying to the
cause of an infant's death, gratuitously offered evidence that buggery had
been committed on the infant. It was conceded that the abuse could not
be linked to the defendant. In holding the evidence irrelevant, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, stated that: "[P]roof of . . . commis-
sion [of independent crimes] and of the connection of the accused on
210. Christie v. State, 246 So.2d 605, 608 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
211. Franklin v. State, 229 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
212. 239 So.2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
213. 237 So.2d 286 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
214. 241 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
215. 225 So.2d 925 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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trial therewith, must be not 'vague and uncertain', but clear and con-
vincing. ' 2 16
The Williams rule has been applied to situations other than attempts
at trial to prove collateral crimes. The rule has also been applied to admit
a statement which contained references to another crime when there was
some evidence that the previous crime had been committed.217 Addition-
ally, the rule has been applied to "non-crimes." In Anthony v. State,218
the defendant was charged with manslaughter as a result of driving while
intoxicated. On cross-examination of the defendant the state elicited evi-
dence that the defendant had been previously hospitalized for alcoholism
and "for her nerves." The hospitalizations had occurred two and one
half to three years previously; thus the evidence was held inadmissible
as being too remote.
Frequently the connection between the principal crime and the col-
lateral crime is tenuous. In two connected cases, a single defendant was
charged with rape and murder.219 In the rape prosecution evidence of
the murder came in to prove the defendant's identity. The crimes were
connected by a circle of clothing, palm prints, a gun, and an identifica-
tion by an eyewitness. Evidence of the alleged rape also was admitted
in the subsequent murder prosecution where identity was not in issue.
The facts, briefly stated, showed that shortly after commission of the
rape the victim heard a gunshot. The accused was linked to a shooting
in the same neighborhood at about the same time and the jury was al-
lowed to use this collateral evidence to infer that the defendant had com-
mitted the rape. Another case involving a similarly tenuous link to a
principal crime was Bryant v. State.22° In Bryant, evidence of a robbery
committed within five days of the charge of murder was admitted. The
robbery had several features similar to those involved in the alleged mur-
der, and the robbery was committed in the same neighborhood.
In Bogan v. State,221 a case involving two gas station robberies, evi-
dence of the first robbery was admitted at the felony murder prosecution
arising from the second robbery to prove a plan or scheme of criminality
and an intent to commit a criminal act (an element of felony murder).
On the other hand, evidence of other robberies which proves nothing save
the propensity of an accused to commit robbery has been held inad-
missible.222
216. Id. at 926, quoting Wrather v. State, 179 Tenn. 666, 678, 169 S.W.2d 854, 858
(1943).
217. Dempsey v. State, 238 So.2d 446 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 646
(Fla. 1970).
218. 246 So.2d 600 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 249 So.2d 441 (Fla. 1971).
219. Williams v. State, 247 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1971) (rape); Williams v. State, 249 So.2d
743 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) (murder).
220. 235 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1970).
221. 226 So.2d 110 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
222. Franklin v. State, 229 So.2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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Perhaps Wingate v. State22 is the least defensible of the uncharged
offense rulings. In Wingate, evidence of uncharged robberies for which
the defendant had been tried and acquitted were held admissible. Addi-
tionally, evidence of the defendant's escape from a hospital prison ward
was admitted. The admission of escape evidence was held erroneous but
harmless, but evidence of crimes which the defendant had been acquitted
of was held to be admissible as showing a "definite and ascertainable
modus operandi." '224 Logically, if relevancy is the test for admissibility
of evidence, this evidence should have been held inadmissible since an-
other jury had already determined that the defendant did not commit the
other crimes. Also, it could be argued that the state is collaterally es-
topped from reopening the issue of the prior crimes. Nevertheless, the
rule remains that evidence of other crimes does not become inadmissible
even when the defendant has been acquitted of the other crime.225
In addition, evidence of a collateral crime committed after the prin-
cipal crime is admissible at the trial of the principal crime. Thus, evi-
dence relating to the commission of another crime later on the same
day,226 the following morning227 and as long as three months after228 the
principal crime have been held to be admissible.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has recently ruled on
the shifting of the burden of proof in collateral crime situations .2 9 The
court stated that the burden lies initially with the defendant to show a
reason for exclusion. Then, if the defendant offers an objection, the bur-
den shifts to the state to demonstrate the relevancy of the collateral
crime. It has also been held that a comment on a collateral crime, if
erroneously admitted, can be cured with a cautionary instruction.3 0 Pro-
cedurally, it should be noted that areas exist in which collateral crimes
must be proven. One of these areas is a prosecution under a recidivist
statute.3 1
An additional limitation on the admissibility of collateral crimes is
the requirement that the collateral crimes must remain an "incident" of
the principal trial and are not to become a "feature" of the trial.23 2 Flo-
rida courts have thus adopted what can be referred to as the "bulk rule."
In many cases, appellate courts have looked to the number of witnesses
and the percentage of trial testimony involved in introducing the evidence
of a collateral crime for a guide in deciding the admissibility. In Green
223. 232 So.2d 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 994 (1971).
224. Id. at 44.
225. See also Blackburn v. State, 208 So.2d 625 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
226. Baker v. State, 241 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1970).
227. Christinie v. State, 246 So.2d 605 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
228. Headrick v. State, 240 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
229. Franklin v. State, 229 So.2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
230. Rivers v. State, 226 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1969).
231. Johnson v. State, 229 So.2d 13 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
232. Williams v. State, 117 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1960).
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v. State,ss error was found where five of a total of eight witnesses testi-
fied about a collateral crime. However, in most of the "bulk rule" deci-
sions, courts have looked to the number of pages of transcript as the
telling factor. In Fivecoat v. State, 4 testimony about a collateral crime
consumed only seven pages of a 230 page transcript, and only one witness
of thirteen testified to the collateral crime. Consequently, the evidence
was held to have been properly admitted. In Hines v. State,sa testimony
of a deaf mute given through an interpreter and relating to a collateral
rape was admitted by the trial court. The testimony was held admissible,
largely because it consumed only five of several hundred pages in a trial
transcript. Finally, in Keel v. State,236 evidence of other robberies en-
compassed only fourteen pages of the transcript as opposed to fifty pages
which dealt with the principal crime. There, the evidence was held ad-
missible.
Even though the courts should "recognize the increased degree of
sophistication and intelligence which the modern jury possesses for [the]
assessment of evidence .. .and the arguments of counsel," '287 the Keel
decision and a number of others seem indefensible. The current trend of
decisions appears to allow proof of collateral crimes as long as the re-
viewing court can be convinced that the defendant is a "bad guy.; 288
VII. HEARSAY
A. Generally
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence, of a
statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an
assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and
thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out of court
assertion239
Definitions of hearsay are usually filled with exceptions. During the
survey period, no attempts were made by the Florida courts to define
hearsay. The general approach to the problems presented by the hearsay
rule seems to be, "I know hearsay when I see it and this is hearsay." For
233. 228 So.2d 397 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). The court also noted that the state failed to
tie the collateral crime to the principal crime. The state had promised to tie in the collateral
crime with testimony of a ballistics expert to be called later in the trial. When called, the
expert gave essentially negative testimony. Thus, the holding can be explained on this ground.
234. 244 So.2d 188 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
235. 243 So.2d 434 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
236. 243 So.2d 630 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Keel]. The author pre-
fers Cross' dissent to the majority opinion as an exposition of what the rule in this area
should be. Id. at 632.
237. Wingate v. State, 232 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 994
(1971).
238. As to the "bad guy" theory of criminal law, see Judge Mann's opinion in Smith v.
State, 239 So.2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), rev'd, 249 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1970).
239. C. MCCORMiCK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 225, at 460 (1954).
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example, in Hallihan v. State,240 psychological testing reports made by
psychologists for the use and benefit of psychiatrists in formulating a
diagnosis "were clearly hearsay." 24'1 Yet it seems clear that these reports
were not being offered to prove the truth of any particular proposition,
but merely as an index of the mental condition of the person being
examined. On the other hand, in Collins v. State,242 the defendant's re-
sponses to the Miranda warnings were held to have been properly in-
cluded in a hypothetical question to an expert witness. The statements
were said to reveal the "state of mind of the appellant at the time made,
as it might bear on the question of his sanity.' 248 The two cases seem
basically irreconcilable. The fact that the speaker in Hallihan was not
available for examination is apparently not a distinguishing factor. In
DeLaine v. State,244 a photograph with the words "the victim" on the
obverse was admitted, and the admission was held not to be reversible
error.
Most rulings during the survey period seem to revolve around a
few definite categories of hearsay exceptions which will be discussed
below. However, certain decisions defy compartmentalization, and they
will be treated here as a body.
In a recent opinion, hearsay concerning a deceased donor's state-
ments made at or about the time of a certain transaction was held ad-
missible to prove donative intent. 45 On the other hand, testimony by
a woman attempting to prove a common law marriage by using a de-
cedent's words to show an intent to contract marriage was held inad-
missible and properly stricken. In both of these cases, the statements
appear to relate to the operative fact in issue, and therefore, should have
been held admissible as nonhearsay.246
Conduct which may have been intended to articulate a belief pre-
sents additional problems with the hearsay prohibition.2 47 In Tollett v.
State,245 evidence seeking to establish the consent of one party to hav-
ing a telephone conversation recorded 249 was given by a police officer
who testified to the party's words and conduct. The testimony was held
not to be hearsay because the officer was "not testifying as to what
Davis had said, but as to the conduct of Davis."'250 Conversely, in John-
240. 226 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Hallihan].
241. Id. at 413.
242. 227 So.2d 538 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
243. Id. at 539.
244. 230 So.2d 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
245. Sullivan v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 So.2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
246. See C. McColaiCy, LAW or EVIDENCE § 228 (1954); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1770 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res
Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922).
247. See C. McCoRMIcK, LAW oF EVIDENCE § 229 (1954).
248. 244 So.2d 458 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
249. See FLA. STAT. § 822.10 (1969) ; Barber v. State, 172 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
250. Tollett v. State, 244 So.2d 458, 461 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). This author believes that
Judge Rawls' dissent states a better view.
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son v. State,251 the act of pointing out a defendant was treated as hear-
say and held inadmissible in the absence of an applicable exception to
the hearsay rule.
The enforcement of the Miranda requirements took on hearsay
dimensions in two recent cases even though hearsay was not made the
basis of either decision. In Long v. State,252 an officer testified to hear-
ing another officer read a "Miranda card" to the defendant. The other
officer did not testify, and the card was not introduced. The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed on the ground that the re-
quirements of Miranda had not been met. Yet, in Thompson v. State,
253
the officer read the "Miranda card" into the record after testifying that
he had advised the defendant of his rights from the card. In contrast,
an assistant head cashier of a bank has been allowed to testify to the
actions of other bank employees in searching for a certain account.254
Where title to realty was at issue, certain statements by a plain-
tiff's grantor, made at a city council meeting, were proffered.25' The
statements related to the retention of a disputed parcel by the grantor.
The court rejected the statements on two grounds: (1) the statements
were found to be self-serving, and (2) the statements failed to meet
the hearsay exception for "practical construction of a deed by the par-
ties 256 because the statements were made prior to plaintiff's possession.
A rather esoteric hearsay problem was raised in Brown v. State.257
In Brown, the state asked a defense witness whether he knew if a cer-
tain prosecution witness was the father of the defendant. A hearsay
objection was raised and overruled at trial, and on appeal, the objection
was held to have been properly overruled. The lack of harmful error
also played a part in the court's decision. In reaching its decision, the
court did not consider the hearsay exception for "statements and reputa-
tion as to pedigree and family history. '258 In any event, that particu-
lar exception would appear to have been inapplicable in this situation.
Finally, in Pyle v. Washington County School Board,259 the school
board had before it certain statements about risqu6 remarks allegedly
made by a band director in class. The reviewing court apparently felt
that the statements were competent evidence although no mention of
their possible hearsay character appears in the opinion.
B. Business Records
Records of transactions made in the ordinary course of business
are admissible under a Business Records Act exception to the hearsay
251. 249 So.2d 452 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
252. 231 So.2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
253. 235 So.2d 354 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 239 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1970).
254. Clark v. State, 229 So.2d 877 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
255. Drake v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 227 So.2d 709 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
256. Cf. Harrison v. State, 94 Fla. 937, 114 So. 515 (1927).
257. 230 So.2d 177 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
258. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 297 (1954).
259. 238 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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rule if otherwise competent.26° It has been held that summaries of rec-
ords may be admitted under this exception to the hearsay rule. In
Sale-T-Lawn, Inc. v. Agricultural Engineering Association,26' summaries
"made from other records of the defendant which were not produced
or introduced into evidence" '262 were admitted under the Business Rec-
ords Act. The decision looks incorrect unless the summaries themselves
were made in the ordinary course of business. Otherwise, the summaries
would seem inadmissible under the rule of Smith v. Frisch's Big Boy,
Inc. 63 It has also been expressly held that business entries made a
week to ten days after a transaction were not admissible under the
Business Records exception to the hearsay rule, but were "merely a
collection of personal notations, ' 1264 since they were not contemporane-
ous with the transactions nor made in the regular course of business.
This same rationale should apply to foreclose admission of the sum-
maries in Safe-T-Lawn.
Two cases during the survey period rejected the application of the
business records exception to intramural accident reports. In Dusine v.
Golden Shores Convalescent Center, Inc.,265 a head nurse who had not
witnessed a certain accident made out an accident report concerning
the mishap. At trial, the report was denied the benefit of the business
record exception, and its admission was held to be within the trial
court's discretion because the report contained hearsay. In Bowen v.
Seaward Dredging Corp.,266 a similar report was also rejected since it
contained hearsay, but did not meet the requisites of any hearsay ex-
ception. A closely related case held warranty claims forms admissible
under the statute. In Haynes v. International Harvester Co.,2 67 forms
used by an equipment dealer to submit requests for "warranty credit"
to the manufacturer were held to be business records, and therefore,
within the scope of discovery. Furthermore, the court found that the
forms were neither statements made in anticipation of a claim nor work
product.
It has been previously established that hospital records are admis-
sible under the business records exception. 6 This ruling was applied
in Brevard County v. Jacks269 with the qualification that not every
document in a hospital regarding a particular patient qualifies as a
business record.
260. FLA. STAT. § 92.36 (1969).
261. 235 So.2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Saje-T-Lawn].
262. Id. at 26.
263. 208 So.2d 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). See also C. ALLOWAY, FLORIDA EVIDENCE CASE-
BOOK pt. II, 34 (1971); Conrad, Hearsay Exceptions-Business Records, in FLORIDA BAR
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, EVIDENCE 1N FLORIDA § 12.5 (1971).
264. E.Z.E., Inc. v. Jackson, 235 So.2d 337, 339 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
265. 249 So.2d 40 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
266. 242 So.2d 151 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
267. 227 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
268. Stettler v. Huggins, 134 So.2d 534 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
269. 238 So.2d 156 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). In this case, evidence of hospital treatment
of epilepsy which arose out of a swimming accident was admitted.
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Business records were involved in two other cases decided during
the survey period, even though no mention was made of the applicable
statute. In Thompson v. State, 270 retail price tags were admitted to prove
the value of merchandise stolen in a grand larceny prosecution. In an
action against an insurance agency for the negligent failure to secure
insurance, the court refused to admit a letter from another agency
through which a defendant agency had sought to secure insurance.
271
It was unclear who sought to introduce the letter and for what pur-
pose, but the ground for rejection was a lack of privity which prevented
the statements from becoming binding on the parties. An argument
could have been made for admission on the basis of the business records
statute but the facts are not sufficiently clear to determine whether the
argument would have been tenable.
C. Admissions and Declarations Against Interest
In DeLong v. Williams,272 the defense counsel in an automobile
collision case read testimony to the jury which had been given by a
plaintiff in support of a previous workmen's compensation claim for
a similar injury. The testimony was held to be a permissible admission
against interest, but was rejected because of the particular form of proof
employed. 27 In another automobile accident case,274 a plaintiff's com-
ment made at the scene of the accident to the effect that the defendant
was blameless was admitted as an admission. The contemporaneous
nature of the statement suggests that it might also have been admis-
sible as an excited utterance.275
The declaration against interest exception has also been applied
in the criminal law field. In Grant v. State,276 a statement by the de-
fendant to a companion was held admissible. The companion reported
that: "Eddie (appellant) said that there goes the man who he robbed
his store that Thursday night and so he said the man recognized him
and he recognized the man because he had glasses on."277 The state-
ment was clearly of a hearsay nature, but the exception for admissions
by a party provided a basis for its admission. In addition, an admis-
sion made in a "jocular manner" has been held admissible. The fact
that the admission was made in such a manner was held to go to weight
of the evidence rather than to its admissibility.278
270. 249 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
271. Murray M. Sheldon, Inc. v. Azif, 230 So.2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
272. 232 So.2d 246 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
273. See section VII, D, infra.
274. Lowe v. Shearer, 239 So.2d 86 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 813
(Fla. 1970).
275. See Custer v. State, 159 Fla. 574, 34 So.2d 100 (1948); C. McCoR.icK, LAW OF
EVImENCE § 272 (1954).
276. 240 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
277. Id. at 170.
278. Anderson v. State, 241 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1970).
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Only one instance of an attempt to admit a declaration against
interest appeared during the survey period. Normally, admissions are
made by parties to the action or their privies, while declarations are made
by non-parties. 279 Diamond v. State280 presented an interesting twist.
There, the petitioner sought a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence. The fresh evidence proffered was a statement by the
driver of the car in which the defendant had been arrested for posses-
sion of marijuana. The statement, made to the arresting officer shortly
after the arrest, was to the effect that the defendant did not know that
contraband was in the car until the driver told him to throw it out
after the police had commenced pursuit. The court held that the state-
ment was non-admissible hearsay, and therefore not newly discovered
evidence sufficient to sustain a motion for a new trial. It has been sug-
gested that Florida has apparently taken no position on whether a
declaration against a penal interest is admissible,28 ' but the majority
view seems to be that a monetary or proprietary interest is required
and that a mere penal interest will not suffice. 2
Finally, it should be noted that vicarious admissions can come in
to bind parties in privity with the speaker. Thus, in Thee v. Manor
Pines Convalescent Center,28 the statement of a person in a nurse's
uniform that "milk got spilled but we mopped it up" came in to bind
the nursing home.
D. Presence of the Defendant
There has been quite a bit of loose language in Florida decisions
concerning statements made in the presence of a criminal defendant.
Courts have admitted these statements for a variety of reasons, but
there still appears to be no Florida case holding a statement admissible
on this ground alone. The statements in the cases have supposedly re-
sulted from confusion with the rules regarding admissions adopted by
silence.28 4 If this is the basis of the exceptions, problems of constitu-
tional magnitude would be presented if such statements were admitted
solely on the basis of this exception.285 During the period of this survey
this exception has been discussed in at least four cases. In Harrolle v.
State,286 a state witness was cross-examined regarding statements made
by a decedent about the defendant. The question was directed to a
279. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 254 (1954).
280. 233 So.2d 418 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
281. See C. ALLOWAY, FLORIDA EVIDENCE CASEBOOK pt. II, 78 (1971). But see Atlantic
C.L. R.R. v. Crosby, 53 Fla. 400, 43 So. 318 (1907).
282. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1476-77 (3d ed. 1940 and Supp. 1970).
283. 235 So.2d 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
284. Conrad, The Hearsay Rule, in FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, EvI-
DENCE IN FLORIDA § 5.2 (1971).
285. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 n.37 (1966) with Harris v. New York,
91 S. Ct. 643 (1971), noted in 25 U. MiAmr L. REv. 531 (1971). See also Young v. State,
234 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1970).
286. 235 So.2d 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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statement by the deceased telling the defendant to keep off the de-
ceased's property. The statement was held inadmissible as not being
within the only hearsay exception discussed, i.e., statements made in
the presence of the defendant. It seems, however, that the statement
might be admissible as a statement of the declarant's present state of
mind.2"' In Wilkerson v. State,211 statements made by a codefendant
about the defendant were held inadmissible because they were not made
within the presence of the defendant. Again, the ruling might have over-
looked a possible ground for admitting the statement under the co-con-
spiracy exception. 28 9
During the survey period, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, became the champion of a rational approach to this particular
exception. In Johnson v. State,290 the act of pointing out an accused
in his conscious presence was held inadmissible in a subsequent prose-
cution. The court specifically rejected the argument that this conduct
hearsay was admissible because it transpired in the defendant's pres-
ence and stated that: "any concept that an otherwise inadmissible hear-
say declaration is made admissible merely because it was stated in the
presence of a party is erroneous.129 1 This statement was probably an
outgrowth of the Fourth District's decision in Wakeman v. State.2 92
There, the evidence in question was a witness' statement to a police
officer allegedly quoting a shooting victim as having stated that the
defendant shot him. Initially, the statement was held admissible as a
part of the res gestae, but on rehearing, the court retreated from that
conclusion and limited its application to the particular facts of the case.
The statement in Wakeman was made in the presence of the defendant
and not denied. The court stated that as a general rule such statements
are admissible, but since the defendant had been battered, intoxicated,
and probably incapable of denying anything in that particular case, the
statement would be inadmissible. Curiously enough, the statement was
admitted as a part of the res gestae. However, in the process, res gestae
was discussed as being approximately equal to the exception for excited
utterances, and the "presence of the defendant" exception was approx-
imately equated with adoptive admissions. If these views persist, at
least some measure of rationality and predictability will be brought to
this particular hearsay exception.298
287. See C. McCoi,.icx, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 268 (1954).
288. 232 So.2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
289. See Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963); Farnell v. State, 214
So.2d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
290. 249 So.2d 452 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
291. Id. at 455. Although undoubtedly correct when applied to the facts of this case,
it is submitted that the statement goes too far. See Sullivan v. McMillian, 26 Fla. 543, 8 So.
450 (1890) and C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 247 (1954).
292. 237 So.2d 61 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. dismissed, 243 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Wakeman].
293. But see note 285 supra and accompanying text.
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E. Testimony Taken in a Former Proceeding
In DeLong v. Williams,294 testimony from a previous workmen's
compensation action was read to the jury in an automobile collision
case. The plaintiff's claims were for similar injuries. The reading of
the transcript was held erroneous because the transcript was not prop-
erly authenticated by a sponsor. Apparently, the sponsor that the court
had in mind was the court reporter who had transcribed the previous
testimony. The presence of such a sponsor, however, is not an absolute
requirement. In Richardson v. State,295 a state witness was permitted
to recall a deceased witness' testimony at a preliminary hearing where
no court reporter had been present, and no record of the hearing had
been made. The witness had been cross-examined at the hearing, which
militated toward admitting the recollection.
VIII. JUDICIAL NOTICE
"The doctrine of Judicial Notice allows courts, both trial and ap-
pellate, to take cognizance of certain facts without formal proof.) 296
During the period under survey, the courts have judicially noticed: (1)
That municipal courts used suspended sentences to great advantage; 21 7
(2) that riots occurred in Miami during the 1968 Republican conven-
tion; 298 (3) that Florida's 1200 mile coastline is constantly changing; 299
(4) that the human gestation period is nine months; 0 (5) that the
owner of a credit card tends to safeguard it against theft; 01 (6) the
distance between Thomasville, Georgia and Monticello, Florida;10 2 and
(7) that the construction of a limited access highway and interchange
increased the value of remaining land fifty fold. 08 On the other hand,
judicial notice has been denied to municipal ordinances, 0 4 and to the
294. 232 So.2d 246 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
295. 247 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1971).
296. Tjoflat, Judicial Notice; Presumptions; Burden of Proof, in FLORIDA BAR CONTINU-
ING LEGAL EDUCATION EVIDENCE IN FLORIDA § 2.1 (1971).
297. State ex rel Johnson v. Vizzini, 227 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1969).
298. Wong v. City of Miami, 229 So.2d 659 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), aff'd, 232 So.2d 132
(Fla. 1970).
299. Kirk v. Kennedy, 231 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
300. Smith v. Wise, 234 So.2d 145 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 422 (Fla.
1970).
301. Schuster v. State, 235 So.2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). But query: Isn't the reason-
able man careless once in a while in failing to safeguard his credit cards? Also, interestingly
enough, the facts of the instant case do not bear out what the court judicially noticed.
302. General Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Broxsie, 239 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). At least
this appears to be what the court was judicially noticing. The court's statement was that:
"The Court judicially knows that Thomasville, Georgia is 30 miles north of Pauline Parker's
home which is located in the vicinity of Monticello, Florida." Id. at 596. Query: Did the
court know where Pauline lived, or where Monticello was?
303. Levit v. State Dept. of Transp., 248 So.2d 542 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1971), cert. denied,
252 So.2d 802 (Fla. 1971). That there would be an increase in value is probably beyond
dispute. But query: Is the fifty fold figure common knowledge?
304. Applied Research Laboratories v. Homer, 249 So.2d 732 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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proposition that a certain number of condominium owners is sufficiently
large to require a class action. °5
Finally, information contained in the Federal Register was judi-
cially noticed&°6 pursuant to the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act. °7
IX. ACCIDENT REPORTS
Reports of traffic accidents made for statistical purposes to the
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles are confidential by
statute in Florida."0 ' Because of this confidentiality, the reports them-
selves are inadmissible in any litigation arising from the accident. 0 9
Problems continue to arise, however, as to the scope of the accident
reports privilege.
First, it is clear that not every report of an accident is entitled to
the protection of the statute. For example, intramural accident reports
may be discovered and used without reference to the statute.810 Second,
in State ex rel Duncan v. Crews,"' the court held that a traffic homi-
cide report may be produced for inspection by a defendant in rare cases.
Allegations were made that the report was confidential and constituted
a part of the prosecution's work product, but the order for its produc-
tion was not set aside on interlocutory appeal.
In Mitchell v. State,"1 2 the District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, held that a blood test taken at a hospital before an accident report
was completed was inadmissible. The report had not been completed
because the injured party did not have his driver's license in his pos-
session. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed 13 and held
that a blood test taken while a defendant (not under arrest) is in a
hospital, before an accident report has been commenced is admissible.
The court stated that:
The test for the statutory exclusion ... is whether the informa-
tion sought to be excluded was taken by the investigating of-
ficer for the purpose of making his accident report and formed
a basis for that report."1 4
Apparently, this rule permits the admission of such tests as long
as they were not made expressly for the purpose of completing the
accident report.
305. Hendler v. Rogers House Condominium, Inc., 234 So.2d 128 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
306. Freimuth v. State, 249 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
307. FLA. STAT. § 92.031 (1969).
308. FLA. STAT. § 317.171 (1969) and FLA. STAT. § 186.08 (1969).
309. Herbert v. Garner, 78 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1955).
310. See notes 265 and 266 supra and accompanying text.
311. 241 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
312. 227 So.2d 728 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
313. State v. Mitchell, 245 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1971).
314. Id. at 623.
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X. DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
Evidence of transactions with persons who are deceased at the time
of litigation may be excluded under the Dead Man's Statute.31 How-
ever, the statute has exceptions, three of them were mentioned recently
by Florida courts. The first exception was presented in Sullivan v. Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Co.,3"6 where hearsay relating to state-
ments of a deceased donor were admitted into evidence to prove donative
intent. The case arguably stands for the proposition that a gift is not
a transaction within the meaning of the Dead Man's Statute. The hold-
ing, however, is bottomed on other grounds.
A second exception was applied in Tom v. Messinger.31 7 In Tom,
an issue arose as to who was driving a car at the time of a multiple
death crash. The court held that the Dead Man's Statute did not apply
to evidence showing that the decedent had assumed the driving chores
before the accident. The court found that the transfer of control was not
a transaction within the meaning of the statute.
Finally, in Olshen v. Robinson, 18 the court refused to apply a
third exception to the statute for transactions with corporate officers319
where the transaction in question involved a corporate officer acting
personally and not in his official capacity.
XI. DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
A. Generally
Demonstrative evidence generally consists of tangible things or rep-
resentations of tangible things.
Demonstrative evidence stands in contrast with testimonial evi-
dence, where the trier is asked to believe that certain facts are
true only because the witness (or the hearsay declarant) states
them to be so.320
Since things do not generally authenticate themselves, the evidence must
be identified and authenticated by a witness who will testify that the
object has some relevancy to the proceedings.321
A demonstration without the aid of tangible things may also be
considered as demonstrative evidence. Thus, in Spackman v. Laumer,322
a schoolboy safety patrolman was allowed to demonstrate to the jury
the position of a child as he fell from his bicycle into the path of a
315. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1969).
316. 230 So.2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
317. 235 So.2d 333 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 429 (Fla. 1970) [herein-
after cited as Tom].
318. 248 So.2d 534 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
319. Tharp v. Kitchell, 151 Fla. 226, 9 So.2d 457 (1942).
320. C. McCoRmiCK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 179, at 384 (1954).
321. Id. at § 179.
322. 237 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 239 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1970).
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car. However, there was no description of the demonstration in the rec-
ord for the benefit of the reviewing court. Consequently, the practice
should be to read a short description of this type of act into the record.
In Tripi v. State," a prosecution for breaking and entering, the
defendant raised no objection to the admission of a knife with a broken
blade found at the scene. Later, when the broken-off portion of the blade
was proffered, the defendant objected that the prosecution had not
shown that the fragment had been broken from the knife previously
admitted. The knife point was held admissible for comparison "as an
item found at the scene" and to be accorded whatever weight the trier
of fact might attach thereto. There was an additional objection to the
lack of expert qualifications of the item's sponsor, but it would seem
that no expertise would be required in this instance.
In another case, Simmons v. State,24 the forgery victim testified
that the signature on a credit card charge slip was not his own. He then
signed his name in court for a specimen which the jury was allowed to
compare with the credit card slip. It was held to be error to allow the
signature to be manufactured in court and admitted into evidence.825
Tangible things which are not relevant and which may be prejudi-
cial can be kept from the jury's view. Thus, in Caldwell v. State,326 a
criminal defendant was not allowed to openly display his Bible before
the jury. The trial court offered him "a splendid, unused manila en-
velope" in which to place the Bible if the defendant desired to keep it
with him during the trial. Additionally, evidence about tangible things
may be suppressed if the things themselves cannot be made available
to the opposition. Thus, in Johnson v. State, 27 the testimony of a bal-
listics expert was held to have been improperly admitted when the bullet
had been lost by the state. The court reasoned that the loss of the
bullet prevented the defendant from achieving effective discovery and
cross examination.
B. Photographs
Photographs are admissible when there is a witness who can identify
the photograph as a portrayal of relevant facts. 28 In criminal prosecu-
tions the state may have an absolute right to present relevant photo-
graphs. In Williams v. State,829 photographs of a murder victim which
were neither gory nor inflammatory were admitted. The defendant had
offered to stipulate to whatever facts the photographs might reveal, but the
state's refusal to stipulate was upheld on appeal.
323. 234 So.2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 110 (Fla. 1970).
324. 248 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
325. On the methods of proof of handwriting generally, see C. ALLOWAY, FLORIDA Evi-
DENCE CASEBOOK pt. II, 27 (1971).
326. 243 So.2d 422 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1971), appeal dismissed, 247 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1971).
327. 249 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
328. C. McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EVIDECCE § 181 (1954).
329. 228 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1969).
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That a photograph may be prejudicial is not in and of itself sufficient
grounds for excluding the photograph. In Furr v. State,330 a photograph
was admitted to show the position of vehicles after an accident and the
position of a decedent's head as he was being removed from the car. The
photograph was said to be "relevant to show the circumstances surround-
ing decedent's death,"' 31 and because the photograph was in black and
white, the blood stains it depicted were not found to be sufficiently in-
flammatory to require exclusion.
In Jackson v. State,"2 two black and white photographs of a murder
victim, taken at a morgue shortly after death, were admitted. The prose-
cution had charged the defendant with stabbing the victim with a knife,
and at the time of admission, the photos were the only proof that the
victim had actually been stabbed. Likewise, no cause of death had been
established at that time. Subsequent testimony was offered to prove these
points, and the photographs were held to corroborate this later testi-
mony. 33
In addition, the sponsor of photographs may be aided by other
testimony in establishing a predicate for admitting the picture. In De-
Laine v. State, 3 4 photographs were held properly admitted when the
photographer testified that he could not remember the date on which they
were taken, but a police officer supplied the date at a later point in the
trial.
The use of photographs, however, may be abused, and their ad-
missibility is subject to review. In Young v. State,3 5 twenty-two of forty-
five photographs that were admitted into evidence showed the badly
decomposed torso of the victim. The admission was held prejudicial be-
cause, although some were relevant, there were simply too many of them.
In Saxon v. State,"6 a medical examiner used photographs to aid his
testimony about the cause of death of an infant. The photographs also
revealed the commission of a collateral crime, and the witness elaborated
on this collateral crime. The admission of the testimony was held to be
error because the collateral crime was not sufficiently connected with the
defendant, and the photographs would probably be inadmissible on the
same ground.
Photographs of the scene of an injury have been held sufficient to
raise jury questions as to negligence and contributory negligence.337 On
330. 229 So.2d 269 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
331. Id. at 270.
332. 231 So.2d 839 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
333. If the photographs had been the only proof of these facts the decision would appear
reasonable. However, other testimony was available and later admitted on these points, and
the case seems to turn largely on order of proof. Query: Would these photographs have been
admissible if presented subsequent to other proof of these issues?
334. 230 So.2d 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
335. 234 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1970).
336. 225 So.2d 925 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
337. Bowen v. Seaward Dredging Corp., 242 So.2d 151 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as Bowen].
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the other hand, it also has been held that a jury may not draw a conclu-
sion from photographs which is contrary to other competent evidence. 8
Both Bowen and Dybalski should be read and compared as indications
of the proper weight to be accorded photographs in jury deliberations.
C. Motion Pictures
Motion pictures are generally admitted on the same basis as still
pictures. However, a greater degree of discretion is often accorded the
trial court in admitting them because of their greater consumption of trial
time.83 9 In Continental Casualty Co. v. McClure,4 ' a claim arose from
the discharge of a shotgun due to an allegedly defective safety. Expert
testimony concerning the defect and an in-court experiment with the
same shotgun were admitted. A motion picture of a car crossing railroad
tracks containing a shotgun which was supposedly in the same position
as the plaintiff claimed the defective gun was in at the time of discharge
was proffered. The film was sponsored by an engineer who used a car
in the film similar, but not identical to the plaintiff's. The film was re-
jected because circumstances in the two instances were not shown to
have been comparable. The court noted that variables such as tire pressure
and the condition of shock absorbers could have affected the outcome.
The film had also been made "ex parte" which was stated to be un-
acceptable.
In Baker v. State,"4 a re-enactment of the crime on motion picture
film was admitted into evidence. The charge was robbery and assault
with a hammer, crimes normally capable of vocal explanation. The Su-
preme Court of Florida held, however, that: "None of the re-enactment
film was given to the jury after they retired. In these circumstances, no
error has been made to appear. '8 42
D. Other Audio-Visual Aids
There seems to be a current vogue calling for graphic illustrations
of confessions of criminal defendants. This trend probably reached its
zenith in Paramore v. State. 48 In that case, a videotape of a defendant's
confession was held to have been properly admitted. The court also held
that it was unnecessary to prove continuity of possession as long as the
tape had been established as an accurate reproduction of the events
which transpired. 44 Additionally, in Dodd v. State, 45 a recording of a
confession made on "a Gray Recording Machine" and later transcribed
338. Dybalski v. Nichols, 227 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Dybalski].
339. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 181 (1954).
340. 225 So.2d 590 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
341. 241 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1970).
342. Id. at 686.
343. 229 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1969).
344. See also section XI, G, infra, relating to chains of custody.
345. 232 So.2d 235 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), cert. discharged, 241 So.2d 384 (Fla. 1970).
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was admitted and played to the jury. There, however, the defendant had
specifically requested that the confession be played to the jury.
In Simpson v. Broward County,846 the trial court excluded certain
sound recordings in a pretrial order. The recordings were of aircraft
passing over property above which the plaintiff claimed that an aviga-
tional easement had been taken by inverse condemnation. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the ruling was not reviewable
by certiorari, but that it could be reviewed on appeal from a final judg-
ment in the action. In Wasley v. State,84 7 thirty-five millimeter color
slides, as well as eight by ten color photographs, were held to have been
properly used by a medical examiner to show injuries suffered by a de-
cedent.
E. Chain of Custody
The previous requirements of the establishment of a chain of custody
of demonstrative evidence seem to have been relaxed during the period
under survey. In Paramore v. State,848 a videotape confession was intro-
duced. The Supreme Court of Florida held that it was unnecessary to
prove continuity of possession as long as the videotape was established
as an accurate reproduction of the events it purported to depict. Simi-
larly, in Stunson v. State,849 marijuana was admitted, even though no
chain of custody through "live witnesses" had been established. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District, stated that "the test is whether or
not there is an indication of probable tampering with the evidence. '88 0
Apparently, at one point, the whereabouts of the evidence could not
be explained. Nevertheless, the evidence was admitted. In Perkins v.
State,38 1 a rape victim's pocketbook, reportedly found in the yard of a
defendant's family by the defendant's sister, was admitted. The evidence
was held to have been properly admitted,
it being permissible for the State to demonstrate merely that it
obtained custody of the exhibit from those persons who had
control and free access to premises visited and occupied by the
appellant. 52
The District Court of Appeal, First District, in Collins v. State, 53
examined magazines attached to a hearing examiner's findings of fact,
"presumably being some of the magazines taken from the petitioner's
place of business . . .,,111 Perhaps the origin of those magazines should
346. 241 So.2d 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
347. 244 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1971).
348. 229 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1969).
349. 228 So.2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
350. Id. at 294.
351. 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969).
352. Id. at 389.
353. 239 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
354. Id. at 614. Pornography fanciers are urged to see the appendix filed in this case. The
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have been demonstrated in some more conclusive manner. Finally, it was
held that a failure to list a chain of custody witnesses on a witness lis 55
does not prevent the trial court from exercising its discretion and allow-
ing them to testify. 5 6
F. Jury Procedures
In the discretion of the trial court, the jury may be taken to view
anything relevant to the controversy. 57 In an action arising from a rail-
road crossing collision between a freight train and a fire truck, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, First District, held, however, that a juror who
takes a view of the scene of an accident on his own time jeopardizes the
jury verdict. The court held that the juror's action was not the proper
subject of a motion for a new trial, but also hinted that the activity was
improper.358
In State ex rel Pryor v. Smith,859 four photographs of a murder vic-
tim and a deposition of a state witness, none of which had been admitted
into evidence, were allowed into the jury room. The entry of this unad-
mitted evidence was held to be an "impermissible intrusion of the jury's
deliberative process. . . ." 0 In another case, marking exhibits already
admitted into evidence in the presence of a jury after the state had rested
its case was held not to be harmful error. 61
XII. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
A. Generally
The requirements for the admission of writings and evidence con-
cerning writings are unique in many respects. Many of these require-
ments are statutory. In some instances, the statutory requirements may be
waived and the evidence received. Thus, in Meltsner v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.,862 an insurance policy that had not been countersigned by
a local agent as required by statute" 3 was admitted when facts demon-
appendix meets at least two of the three elements of the test of Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957).
355. FLA. R. Cam . P. 1.220(e).
356. Howard v. State, 239 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
357. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.520.
358. The District Court of Appeal, First District, filed four identical opinions to this
effect in four different appeals. Flowers v. Florida E.C. R.R., 237 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1970); Wood v. Florida E.C. R.R., 237 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); Shad v. Florida
E.C. R.R., 236 So.2d 477 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); and Sneling v. Florida E.C. R.R., 236 So.2d
465 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
359. 239 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), appeal dismissed, 241 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1970). See
also Baker v. State, 241 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1970).
360. State ex rel. Payor v. Baker, 239 So.2d 85, 86 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), appeal dismissed,
241 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1970).
361. Rodriguez v. State, 237 So.2d 772 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 644
(Fla. 1970).
362. 233 So.2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
363. FLA. STAT. § 624.0224(1) (1969).
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strated a waiver of this requirement. Similarly, a lack of the formalities
required for the recording of an instrument has been held to be no bar
to its admissibility. In Windle v. Sebold, 64 the defendant in a suit on a
note proffered a written "satisfaction of mortgage" instrument which
recited payment of the note sued upon. Although the statute relating to
authentication of disputed writings was complied with, 65 the trial court
refused to admit the document because there had been no showing of a
delivery of the note, or of satisfactory compliance with the formalities
required for recordation. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
reversed and added that the common law rule that testimony of a sub-
scribing witness must be presented when an attested document is sought
to be introduced is not in effect in Florida.86
In Crowe v. Overland Hauling, Inc.,867 the plaintiff sought to admit
bills for medication. The treating physician testified that he had pre-
scribed the drugs, and the plaintiff identified the pharmacy bills. The
trial court denied admission on the ground that the predicate was in-
sufficient since there was no connection between the bills and the injury
shown in the absence of the drug names and the physician's name being
shown on the bills. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
trict, held that a prima facie case for admissibility had been made, and
that the burden had therefore shifted to the defendant to go forward with
evidence of unrelatedness.
B. Best Evidence Rule
The best evidence rule, in its contemporary form, requires the pro-
duction of an original writing when its contents are sought to be intro-
duced into evidence."8 Among the various exceptions to the rule is the
situation where a document is in the possession of an adversary. In Kirk
v. State,69 it was held that secondary evidence regarding the contents
of a writing in the defendant's possession is admissible only if a founda-
tion is laid by giving the defendant reasonable notice to produce the
original.
In Inter-American Transport Equipment Co. v. Frank,370 the plain-
tiff's office ledgers were proffered for impeachment purposes. The ledgers
were excluded, but on the ground that the scope of impeachment is
largely a subject for the exercise of the trial court's discretion. In Saje-T-
Lawn, Inc. v. Agricultural Engineering Association,871 summaries made
from other records of the defendant were introduced without mention
of the best evidence rule. Finally, in Town of Palm Beach v. City of
364. 241 So.2d 165 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
365. FLA. STAT. § 92.38 (1969).
366. See also Williams v. Keyser, 11 Fla. 234 (1866).
367. 245 So.2d 654 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
368. C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF EvmENCE §§ 195-96 (1954).
369. 227 So.2d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
370. 227 So.2d 699 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
371. 235 So.2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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West Palm Beach,872 the director of the local air and water pollution
commission was allowed to testify to the context of the rules of the com-
mission and their effect.
C. Ordinances and Judgments
Town of Palm Beach v. City of West Palm Beach 73 may indicate
a method of proving the rules of a regulatory commission. In Arnold v.
McGrady,74 the safety rules of Greyhound Lines, Incorporated were
apparently proven in a similar manner. An unpublished opinion of a
federal district court was admitted in an apparently similar fashion in
Belcher Towing Co. v. Board of County Commissioners.375 Finally, in
Riley v. Jackson,7 6 the District Court of Appeals, Third District, held
that permitting counsel in a traffic accident case to read a municipal or-
dinance to the jury was not error.
Written evidence of judgments was treated liberally during the sur-
vey period. Thus, in Bryant v. Haarala,877 the unsworn statement of the
clerk of "a criminal court" which showed that the defendant had pleaded
guilty to reckless driving was admitted. The court noted that the docu-
ment was technically insufficient but found its reception to have been
harmless error. In another action, an authenticated decree of the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois was admitted to prove
the existence and legal effect of a final judgment.78
D. Official Records
In an action in which ownership of a motor vehicle was in issue, it
was held to be error to refuse to admit a title certificate for the ve-
hicle.87 9 Further, in a divorce action, the following records were admitted
on the issue of the husband's net worth: (1) tax schedules prepared by
counsel; (2) other income schedules of unstated origin; and, (3) a loan
application made and signed by the husband. 880 In Nichols v. State,"s'
the negative fact of a lack of a beverage license was held to have been
adequately proven by testimony of a detective and a state beverage agent
because they had actual knowledge that the place where the liquor was
seized was not a licensed liquor store. Consequently, there was no need
to call the custodian of the state records to prove the fact. Finally, the
372. 239 So.2d 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
373. Id.
374. 239 So.2d 854 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
375. 233 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). The court seemed to believe that such an
admission might be error in a jury trial in the absence of a showing that the opinion was
binding on a party by either res judicata or collateral estoppel.
376. 246 So.2d 625 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
377. 245 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
378. Furnari v. Goodman, 242 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
379. Skroh v. Newby, 237 So.2d 548 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
380. Elkins v. Elkins, 228 So.2d 105 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
381. 231 So.2d 526 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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Florida Attorney General has rendered an opinion stating that the divi-
sion of driver's licenses may set forth a record of stolen driver's licenses
and that such certified record is admissible evidence to prove the fact
of theft. 82
XIII. LEGISLATION
The 1970 session of the legislature revised the statutory privilege
for communications with psychologists38 to make this privilege more
nearly conform to that granted communications with psychiatrists.884
Regrettably, however, neither the 1970 nor the 1971 session managed
to pass a similar privilege for the doctor-patient communication.
Records of carriers were made available to assist in enforcing the
Florida Hazardous Substances Law.8 When obtained, these records
may not be used against the person furnishing them.8
The 1970 session also enacted a special section controlling the gath-
ering of evidence and the testimony of witnesses in proceedings to investi-
gate bailbondsmen.8 7
A variety of new privileges for records of various social service type
organizations was enacted by the 1971 session of the legislature. The
1971 Mental Health Act (also referred to as The Baker Act) contains a
section making the clinical records of patients seeking hospitalization
under the Act confidential. 88 The Comprehensive Alcoholism Prevention,
Control and Treatment Act contains a similar section making the records
of persons treated under that act confidential.8 Similarly, a drug abuse
law which creates "DATE" centers for treatment of drug offenders also
contains a section making the records of these centers confidential. 9 ' The
confidentiality of juvenile court records and reports was also recognized
in an act relating to the probation and treatment of juveniles.89'
The Child Abuse Act contains a provision relating to immunity of
persons making reports 92 as well as a section abrogating the husband-
wife, physician-patient (if any), and other privileges, except the at-
torney-client privilege when they relate to. matters of child neglect and
abuse."'
Confidentiality has also been extended to the reports of examinations
382. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 071-21 (Feb. 12, 1971).
383. FLA. STAT. § 490.32 (Supp. 1970).
384. FLA. STAT. § 90.242 (1969).
385. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.061-.121 (Supp. 1970).
386. FLA. STAT. § 501.111 (Supp. 1970).
387. FLA. STAT. § 648.48 (Supp. 1970).
388. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-131, § 8, amending FLA. STAT. ch. 394 (1969).
389. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-132, § 11.
390. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-222, § 3, amending FLA. STAT. § 397.096 (Supp. 1970). See
also FLA. STAT. § 397.061 (Supp. 1970).
391. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-130, § 7, amending FLA. STAT. § 39.12 (1969).
392. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-97, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 828.041 (1969).
393. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-97, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 828.041(10) (1969).
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of Industrial Savings Banks,"9 4 and the disclosure of evidence and testi-
mony before a grand jury has been proscribed by statute.89
In addition, the immunity statute has been substantially reworded,
and in its present form, immunity would seem to be almost automatic in
certain situations. 9 If the amendment is strictly construed, serious con-
stitutional questions may be raised when the amendment is applied.
Curiously enough, a similar immunity provision appears in the Water
and Sewer System Regulatory Law. 9T
Other legislation during the biennium included a mandatory provision
in the "no fault" automobile insurance law requiring that a claimant
submit to a physical examination and providing for the dissemination of
reports of the examination."0 8 The evidence requirements under the
auto theft and "joyriding" statutes have also been codified and amended
during the last two sessions of the legislature. 99 Finally, perjury as a
ground for disqualification of witnesses has been removed by statute. 0
394. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-200, § 2, amending FLA. STAT. ch. 656 (1969).
395. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-66, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 905.27 (1969).
396. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-99, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (Supp. 1970).
397. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-278, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 367.161 (1969).
398. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-252, § 7. See generally FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.360; Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
399. FLA. STAT. § 814.05 (Supp. 1970); Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-342, amending FLA. STAT.
§ 814.01 (Supp. 1970).
400. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-72, §§ 1-2, amending FLa. STAT. § 90.08 (1969); repealing
FLA. STAT. § 90.07 (1969).
